OBSERVATIONS

ON

The NATURE of CIVIL LIBERTY,

The PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT,

AND

The JUSTICE and POLICY of the WAR with AMERICA.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN APPENDIX,

AND

POSTSCRIPT,

CONTAINING,

A STATE of the NATIONAL DEBT,
An ESTIMATE of the Money drawn from the Public by the TAXES,
AND
An ACCOUNT of the NATIONAL INCOME and EXPENDITURE
since the laſt WAR.

Quis furor iſte novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis——
Heu! miſeri cives? non Hoſtem, inimicaque caſtra,
——— Veſtras Spes uritis. VIRG.

BY RICHARD PRICE, D.D. F.R.S.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON:
Printed for E. and C. DILLY in the *Poultry*, and T. CADELL in the *Strand*. M.DCC.LXXVI.

SAWBRIDGE, MAYOR.

A Common Council holden in the Chamber of the Guild-hall of the City of London, on Thurſday the 14th day of March, 1776.

RESOLVED, That the thanks of this Court be given to the Reverend RICHARD PRICE, Doctor in Divinity, Fellow of the Royal Society, for having laid down, in his late publication of "OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, &c." thoſe ſure principles, upon which alone the ſupreme legiſlative authority of Great Britain over her Colonies can be juſtly or beneficially maintained; and for holding forth thoſe public objects, "without "which it muſt be totally indifferent to the Kingdom, who are "IN, or who are OUT of power."

It is Ordered, That the ſaid Reſolution be fairly tranſcribed, and ſigned by the Town Clerk; and by him delivered to the ſaid Reverend Doctor RICHARD PRICE.

A motion being made, and queſtion put, That the Freedom of this City be preſented, in a Gold Box of the value of Fifty Pounds, to the Reverend Doctor RICHARD PRICE, as a grateful teſtimony of the approbation of this Court for his late pamphlet, intitled, "*Obſervations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles* "*of Government, and the Juſtice and Policy of the War with Ame-* "*rica*;" and that the Chamberlain do attend him with the ſame —the ſame was reſolved in the affirmative, and ordered accordingly.

This Court doth deſire the Right honourable the Lord Mayor to provide the Gold Box upon this occaſion.

PREFACE to the FIRST EDITION.

IN the following OBSERVATIONS, I have taken that liberty of examining public meaſures, which, happily for this kingdom, every perſon in it enjoys. They contain the ſentiments of a private and unconnected man; for which, ſhould there be any thing wrong in them, he alone is anſwerable.

After all that has been written on the diſpute with AMERICA, no reader can expect to be informed, in this Publication, of much that he has not before known. Perhaps, however, he may find in it ſome new matter; and if he ſhould, it will be chiefly in the *Obſervations on the Nature of Civil Liberty*, and the *Policy of the War with America*; and in the *Appendix*.

Feb. 8th, 1776.

PREFACE to the FIFTH EDITION.

THE favourable reception which the following Tract has met with, makes me abundant amends for all the abuſe which it has brought upon me. I ſhould be ill employed, were I to take much notice of this abuſe: But there is one circumſtance attending it which I cannot help juſt mentioning.

The principles on which I have argued form the foundation of every State as far as it is free, and are the ſame with thoſe taught by Mr. LOCKE, and all the writers on Civil Liberty who have been hitherto moſt admired in this country. But I find, with concern, that they are not approved by our Governours; and that they chuſe to decline trying by them their preſent meaſures: For, in a pamphlet which has been circulated by government with great induſtry; theſe principles are pronounced to be "unnatural and wild, incompatible with practice; and the offſpring of the diſtempered "imagination of a man byaſſed by Party, and who writes to deceive."

I muſt take this opportunity to add, that I love quiet too well to think of ever entering into a controverſy with any writers; particularly, NAMELESS ones——Conſcious of good intentions, and unconnected with any Party, I have endeavoured to plead the cauſe of General Liberty and Juſtice; and happy in knowing this, I ſhall, in ſilence, commit myſelf to that indulgence and candour of the Public of which I have had ſo much experience.

March 16th, 1776.

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OBSERVATIONS,

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

OUR Colonies in NORTH AMERICA appear to be now determined to riſk and ſuffer every thing, under the perſuaſion, that GREAT BRITAIN is attempting to rob them of that Liberty to which every member of ſociety, and all civil communities, have a natural and unalienable right. The queſtion, therefore, whether this is a reaſonable perſuaſion, is highly intereſting, and deſerves the moſt careful attention of every *Engliſhman* who values Liberty, and wiſhes to avoid ſtaining himſelf with the guilt of invading it. But it is impoſſible to judge properly of this queſtion without correct ideas of Liberty *in general*; and of the nature, limits, and principles of Civil Liberty *in particular*.—The following obſervations on this ſubject appear to me important, as well as juſt; and I cannot make myſelf eaſy without offering them to the Public at the preſent period, big with events of the laſt conſequence to this kingdom. I do this, with reluctance and pain, urged by ſtrong feelings, but at the ſame time checked by the conſciouſneſs that I am likely to deliver ſentiments not favourable to the preſent meaſures of that government, under which I live, and to which I am a conſtant and zealous well-wiſher. Such, however, are my preſent ſentiments and views, that this is a conſideration of inferior moment with me; and, as I hope never to go beyond the bounds of decent diſcuſſion and expoſtulation, I flatter myſelf, that I ſhall be able to avoid giving any perſon juſt cauſe of offence.

The obſervations with which I ſhall begin, are of a more general and abſtracted nature; but being, in my opinion, of particular conſequence; and neceſſary to introduce what I have principally in view, I hope they will be patiently read and conſidered.

SECT. I. *Of the Nature of Liberty in General.*

IN order to obtain a more diſtinct and accurate view of the nature of Liberty as ſuch, it will be uſeful to conſider it under the four following general diviſions.

Firſt, *Phyſical* Liberty.——Secondly, *Moral* Liberty.——Thirdly, *Religious* Liberty.——And Fourthly, *Civil* Liberty.——Theſe heads comprehend under them all the different kinds of Liberty. And I have placed *Civil* Liberty laſt, becauſe I mean to apply to it all I ſhall ſay of the other kinds of Liberty.

By PHYSICAL LIBERTY I mean that principle of *Spontaneity*, or *Self-determination*, which conſtitutes us *Agents*; or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly *ours*, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cauſe.——MORAL LIBERTY is the power of following, in all circumſtances, our ſenſe of right and wrong; or of acting in conformity to our reflecting and moral principles, without being controuled by any contrary principles.——RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ſignifies the power of exerciſing, without moleſtation, that mode of religion which we think beſt; or of making the deciſions of our own conſciences, reſpecting religious truth, the rule of

our conduct, and not any of the decisions of others.——In like manner; CIVIL LIBERTY is the power of a *Civil Society* or *State* to govern itself by its own discretion; or by laws of its own making, without being subject to any foreign discretion, or to the impositions of any extraneous will or power.

It should be observed, that, according to these definitions of the different kinds of liberty, there is one general idea, that runs through them all; I mean, the idea of *Self-direction*, or *Self-government*.—Did our volitions originate not with *ourselves*, but with some cause over which we have no power; or were we under a necessity of always following some will different from our own, we should want PHYSICAL LIBERTY.

In like manner; he whose perceptions of moral obligation are controuled by his passions has lost his *Moral Liberty*; and the most common language applied to him is, that he wants *Self-government*.

He likewise who, in religion, cannot govern himself by his convictions of religious duty, but is obliged to receive formularies of faith, and to practise modes of worship imposed upon him by others, wants *Religious Liberty*. ——And the Community also that is governed, not by itself, but by some will independent of it, and over which it has no controul, wants *Civil Liberty*.

In all these cases there is a force which stands opposed to the agent's *own* will; and which, as far as it operates, produces *Servitude*.——In the *first* case, this force is incompatible with the very idea of voluntary motion; and the subject of it is a mere passive instrument which never *acts*, but is always *acted upon*.——In the *second* case; this force is the influence of passion getting the better of reason; or the *brute* overpowering and conquering the will of the *man*.——In the *third* case; it is *Human Authority* in religion requiring conformity to particular modes of faith and worship, and superseding *private judgment*.——And in the last case, it is any will distinct from that of the Majority of a Community, which claims a power of making laws for it, and disposing of its property.

This it is, I think, that marks the limit, or that lays the line between *Liberty* and *Slavery*. As far as, in any instance, the operation of any cause comes in to restrain the power of Self-government, so far Slavery is introduced: Nor do I think that a precifer idea than this of Liberty and Slavery can be formed.

I cannot help wishing I could here fix my reader's attention, and engage him to consider carefully the dignity of that blessing to which we give the name of LIBERTY, according to the representation now made of it. There is not a word in the whole compass of language which expresses so much of what is important and excellent. It is, in every view of it, a blessing truly sacred and invaluable.——Without *Physical Liberty*, man would be a machine acted upon by mechanical springs, having no principle of motion in himself, or command over events; and, therefore, incapable of all merit and demerit.—— Without *Moral Liberty* he is a wicked and detestable being, subject to the tyranny of base lusts, and the sport of every vile appetite.——And without *Religious* and *Civil Liberty* he is a poor and abject animal, without rights, without property, and without a conscience, bending his neck to the yoke, and crouching to the will of every silly creature who has the insolence to pretend to authority over him.——Nothing, therefore, can be of so much consequence to us as *Liberty*. It is the foundation of all honour, and the chief privilege and glory of our natures.

In fixing our ideas on the subject of Liberty, it is of particular use to take such an enlarged view of it as I have now given. But the immediate object of the present enquiry being *Civil Liberty*, I will confine to it all the subsequent observations.

SECT.

SECT. II. *Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government.*

FROM what has been ſaid it is obvious, that all civil government, as far as it can be denominated *free*, is the creature of the people. It originates with them. It is conducted under their direction; and has in view nothing but their happineſs. All its different forms are no more than ſo many different modes in which they chuſe to direct their affairs, and to ſecure the quiet enjoyment of their rights.——In every free ſtate every man is his own Legiſlator.——All *taxes* are free-gifts for public ſervices.——All *laws* are particular proviſions or regulations eſtabliſhed by COMMON CONSENT for gaining protection and ſafety.——And all *Magiſtrates* are Truſtees or Deputies for carrying theſe regulations into execution.

Liberty, therefore, is too imperfectly defined when it is ſaid to be "a Government by LAWS, and not by MEN." If the laws are made by one man, or a junto of men in a ſtate, and not by COMMON CONSENT, a government by them does not differ from Slavery. In this caſe it would be a contradiction in terms to ſay that the ſtate governs itſelf.

From hence it is obvious that *Civil Liberty*, in its moſt perfect degree, can be enjoyed only in ſmall ſtates, where every member is capable of giving his ſuffrage in perſon, and of being choſen into public offices. When a ſtate becomes ſo numerous, or when the different parts of it are removed to ſuch diſtances from one another, as to render this impracticable, a diminution of Liberty neceſſarily ariſes. There are, however, in theſe circumſtances, methods by which ſuch near approaches may be made to perfect Liberty as ſhall anſwer all the purpoſes of government, and at the ſame time ſecure every right of human nature.

Tho' all the members of a ſtate ſhould not be capable of giving their ſuffrages on public meaſures, *individually* and *perſonally*, they may do this by the appointment of *Subſtitutes* or *Repreſentatives*. They may entruſt the powers of legiſlation, ſubject to ſuch reſtrictions as they ſhall think neceſſary, with any number of *Delegates*; and whatever can be done by ſuch delegates within the limits of their truſt, may be conſidered as done by the united voice and counſel of the Community.——In this method a free government may be eſtabliſhed in the largeſt ſtate; and it is conceivable that by regulations of this kind, any number of ſtates might be ſubjected to a ſcheme of government, that would exclude the deſolations of war, and produce univerſal peace and order.

Let us think here of what may be practicable in this way with reſpect to *Europe* in particular.———While it continues divided, as it is at preſent, into a great number of independent kingdoms whoſe intereſts are continually claſhing, it is impoſſible but that diſputes will often ariſe which muſt end in war and carnage. It would be no remedy to this evil to make one of theſe ſtates ſupreme over the reſt; and to give it an abſolute plenitude of power to ſuperintend and controul them. This would be to ſubject all the ſtates to the arbitrary diſcretion of one, and to eſtabliſh an ignominious ſlavery not poſſible to be long endured. It would, therefore, be a remedy worſe than the diſeaſe; nor is it poſſible it ſhould be approved by any mind that has not loſt every idea of Civil Liberty. On the contrary.—Let every ſtate, with reſpect to all its internal concerns, be continued independent of all the reſt; and let a general confederacy be formed by the appointment of a SENATE conſiſting of Repreſentatives from all the different ſtates. Let this SENATE poſſeſs the power of managing all the *common* concerns of the united ſtates, and of judging and deciding between them, as a common *Arbiter* or *Umpire*, in all diſputes; having, at the ſame time, under its direction, the common force of the ſtates to ſupport its deciſions.——In theſe circumſtances, each ſeparate ſtate would be ſecure againſt the interference of foreign power in its private concerns, and, therefore, would poſſeſs *Liberty*; and at

the ſame time it would be ſecure againſt all oppreſſion and inſult from every neighbouring ſtate.———Thus might the ſcattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one point; all litigations ſettled as they roſe; univerſal peace preſerved; and nation prevented *from any more lifting up a ſword againſt nation.*

I have obſerved, that tho', in a great ſtate, all the individuals that compoſe it cannot be admitted to an immediate participation in the powers of legiſlation and government, yet they may participate in theſe powers by a delegation of them to a body of repreſentatives.———In this caſe it is evident that the ſtate will be ſtill *free* or *ſelf-governed*; and that it will be more or leſs ſo in proportion as it is more or leſs fairly and adequately repreſented. If the perſons to whom the truſt of government is committed hold their places for ſhort terms; if they are choſen by the unbiaſſed voices of a majority of the ſtate, and ſubject to their inſtructions: Liberty will be enjoyed in its higheſt degree. But if they are choſen for long terms by a part only of the ſtate; and if during that term they are ſubject to no controul from their conſtituents; the very idea of Liberty will be loſt, and the power of chuſing repreſentatives becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a *few*, to chuſe at certain periods, a body of *Maſters* for themſelves and for the reſt of the Community. And if a ſtate is ſo ſunk that the majority of its repreſentatives are elected by a handful of the meaneſt (*a*) perſons in it, whoſe votes are always paid for; and if alſo, there is a higher will on which even theſe mock repreſentatives themſelves depend, and that directs their voices: In theſe circumſtances, it will be an abuſe of language to ſay that the ſtate poſſeſſes Liberty. Private men, indeed, might be allowed the exerciſe of Liberty; as they might alſo under the moſt deſpotic government; but it would be an *indulgence* or *connivance* derived from the ſpirit of the times, or from an accidental mildneſs in the adminiſtration. And, rather than be governed in ſuch a manner, it would perhaps be better to be governed by the will of one man without any repreſentation: For a repreſentation ſo degenerated could anſwer no other end than to miſlead and deceive, by diſguiſing ſlavery, and keeping up a *form* of Liberty when the *reality* was loſt.

Within the limits now mentioned, Liberty may be enjoyed in every poſſible degree; from that which is complete and perfect, to that which is merely nominal; according as the people have more or leſs of a ſhare in government, and of a controuling power over the perſons by whom it is adminiſtered.

In general, to be *free* is to be guided by one's own will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteriſtic of *Servitude*. This is particularly applicable to Political Liberty. That ſtate, I have obſerved, is *free*, which is guided by its own will; or, (which comes to the ſame) by the will of an aſſembly of repreſentatives appointed by itſelf and accountable to itſelf. And every ſtate that is not ſo governed; or in which a body of men repreſenting the people make not an eſſential part of the Legiſlature, is in *ſlavery*.———In order to form the moſt perfect conſtitution of government, there may be the beſt reaſons for joining to ſuch a body of repreſentatives, an *Hereditary Council*, conſiſting of men of the firſt rank in the ſtate, with a *Supreme executive Magiſtrate* at the head of all. This will form uſeful checks in a legiſlature; and contribute to give it vigour, union, and diſpatch, without infringing liberty: for, as long as that part of a government which repreſents the people is a *fair repreſentation*; and alſo has a negative on all public meaſures, together with the ſole power of

(*a*) In *Great Britain*, conſiſting of near ſix *millions* of inhabitants, 5723 perſons, moſt of them the loweſt of the people, elect one half of the *Houſe of Commons*; and 364 votes chuſe a ninth part. This may be ſeen diſtinctly made out in the *Political Diſquiſitions*, Vol. I. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and uſeful inſtruction.

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impoſing taxes and originating ſupplies; the eſſentials of Liberty will be preſerved.———We make it our boaſt in this country, that this is our own conſtitution. I will not ſay with how much reaſon.

Of ſuch Liberty as I have now deſcribed, it is impoſſible that there ſhould be an exceſs. Government is an inſtitution for the benefit of the people governed, which they have power to model as they pleaſe; and to ſay, that they can have too much of this power, is to ſay, that there ought to be a power in the ſtate ſuperior to that which gives it being, and from which all juriſdiction in it is derived.——Licentiouſneſs, which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its oppoſite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in oppoſition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. A free ſtate, at the ſame time that it is free itſelf, makes all its members free by excluding licentiouſneſs, and guarding their perſons and property and good name againſt inſult. It is the end of all juſt government, at the ſame time that it ſecures the liberty of the public againſt *foreign* injury, to ſecure the liberty of the individual againſt *private* injury. I do not, therefore, think it ſtrictly juſt to ſay, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private liberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exerciſe of private liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is licentiouſneſs it reſtrains, and liberty itſelf only when uſed to deſtroy liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiouſneſs and deſpotiſm are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconſiſtent with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other difference between them, than that the one is the licentiouſneſs of *great* men, and the other the licentiouſneſs of *little* men; or that, by the one, the perſons and property of a people are ſubject to outrage and invaſion from a King, or a lawleſs body of *Grandees*; and that, by the other, they are ſubject to the like outrage from a *lawleſs mob*——In avoiding one of theſe evils, mankind have often run into the other. But all well-conſtituted governments guard equally againſt both. Indeed of the two, the laſt is, on ſeveral accounts, the leaſt to be dreaded, and has done the leaſt miſchief. It may be truly ſaid, that if licentiouſneſs has deſtroyed its thouſands, deſpotiſm has deſtroyed its millions. The former, having little power, and no ſyſtem to ſupport it, neceſſarily finds its own remedy; and a people ſoon get out of the tumult and anarchy attending it. But a deſpotiſm, wearing the form of government, and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without dreadful ſtruggles. It goes on from age to age, debaſing the human faculties, levelling all diſtinctions, and preying on the rights and bleſſings of ſociety.——It deſerves to be added, that in a ſtate diſturbed by licentiouſneſs, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a ſtate habituated to a deſpotiſm; all is ſtill and torpid. A dark and ſavage tyranny ſtifles every effort of genius; and the mind loſes all its ſpirit and dignity.

Before I proceed to what I have farther in view, I will obſerve, that the account now given of the principles of public Liberty, and the nature of an equal and free government, ſhews what judgment we ſhould form of that OMNIPOTENCE, which, it has been ſaid, muſt belong to every government as ſuch. Great ſtreſs has been laid on this, but moſt unreaſonably.———Government, as has been before obſerved, is, in the very nature of it, a TRUST; and all its powers a DELEGATION for gaining particular ends. This *truſt* may be miſapplied and abuſed. It may be employed to defeat the very ends for which it was inſtituted; and to ſubvert the very rights which it ought to protect.——A PARLIAMENT, for inſtance, conſiſting of a body of repreſentatives, choſen for a limited period, to make laws, and to grant money for public ſervices, would forfeit its authority by making itſelf perpetual, or even prolonging its

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the ſame time it would be ſecure againſt all oppreſſion and inſult from every neighbouring ſtate.———Thus might the ſcattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one point; all litigations ſettled as they roſe; univerſal peace preſerved; and nation prevented *from any more lifting up a ſword againſt nation.*

I have obſerved, that tho', in a great ſtate, all the individuals that compoſe it cannot be admitted to an immediate participation in the powers of legiſlation and government, yet they may participate in theſe powers by a delegation of them to a body of repreſentatives.———In this caſe it is evident that the ſtate will be ſtill *free* or *ſelf-governed*; and that it will be more or leſs ſo in proportion as it is more or leſs fairly and adequately repreſented. If the perſons to whom the truſt of government is committed hold their places for ſhort terms; if they are choſen by the unbiaſſed voices of a majority of the ſtate, and ſubject to their inſtructions: Liberty will be enjoyed in its higheſt degree. But if they are choſen for long terms by a part only of the ſtate; and if during that term they are ſubject to no controul from their conſtituents; the very idea of Liberty will be loſt, and the power of chuſing repreſentatives becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a *few*, to chuſe at certain periods, a body of *Maſters* for themſelves and for the reſt of the Community. And if a ſtate is ſo ſunk that the majority of its repreſentatives are elected by a handful of the meaneſt (*a*) perſons in it, whoſe votes are always paid for; and if alſo, there is a higher will on which even theſe mock repreſentatives themſelves depend, and that directs their voices: In theſe circumſtances, it will be an abuſe of language to ſay that the ſtate poſſeſſes Liberty. Private men, indeed, might be allowed the exerciſe of Liberty; as they might alſo under the moſt deſpotic government; but it would be an *indulgence* or *connivance* derived from the ſpirit of the times, or from an accidental mildneſs in the adminiſtration. And, rather than be governed in ſuch a manner, it would perhaps be better to be governed by the will of one man without any repreſentation: For a repreſentation ſo degenerated could anſwer no other end than to miſlead and deceive, by diſguiſing ſlavery, and keeping up a *form* of Liberty when the *reality* was loſt.

Within the limits now mentioned, Liberty may be enjoyed in every poſſible degree; from that which is complete and perfect, to that which is merely nominal; according as the people have more or leſs of a ſhare in government, and of a controuling power over the perſons by whom it is adminiſtered.

In general, to be *free* is to be guided by one's own will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteriſtic of *Servitude*. This is particularly applicable to Political Liberty. That ſtate, I have obſerved, is *free*, which is guided by its own will; or, (which comes to the ſame) by the will of an aſſembly of repreſentatives appointed by itſelf and accountable to itſelf. And every ſtate that is not ſo governed; or in which a body of men repreſenting the people make not an eſſential part of the Legiſlature, is in *ſlavery*.———In order to form the moſt perfect conſtitution of government, there may be the beſt reaſons for joining to ſuch a body of repreſentatives, an *Hereditary Council*, conſiſting of men of the firſt rank in the ſtate, with a *Supreme executive Magiſtrate* at the head of all. This will form uſeful checks in a legiſlature; and contribute to give it vigour, union, and diſpatch, without infringing liberty: for, as long as that part of a government which repreſents the people is a *fair repreſentation*; and alſo has a negative on all public meaſures, together with the ſole power of

(*a*) In *Great Britain*, conſiſting of near ſix *millions* of inhabitants, 5723 perſons, moſt of them the loweſt of the people, elect one half of the *Houſe of Commons*; and 364 votes chuſe a ninth part. This may be ſeen diſtinctly made out in the *Political Diſquiſitions*, Vol. I. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and uſeful inſtruction.

impoſing taxes and originating ſupplies; the eſſentials of Liberty will be preſerved.———We make it our boaſt in this country, that this is our own conſtitution. I will not ſay with how much reaſon.

Of ſuch Liberty as I have now deſcribed, it is impoſſible that there ſhould be an exceſs. Government is an inſtitution for the benefit of the people governed, which they have power to model as they pleaſe; and to ſay, that they can have too much of this power, is to ſay, that there ought to be a power in the ſtate ſuperior to that which gives it being, and from which all juriſdiction in it is derived.——Licentiouſneſs, which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its oppoſite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in oppoſition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. A free ſtate, at the ſame time that it is free itſelf, makes all its members free by excluding licentiouſneſs, and guarding their perſons and property and good name againſt inſult. It is the end of all juſt government, at the ſame time that it ſecures the liberty of the public againſt *foreign* injury, to ſecure the liberty of the individual againſt *private* injury. I do not, therefore, think it ſtrictly juſt to ſay, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private liberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exerciſe of private liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is licentiouſneſs it reſtrains, and liberty itſelf only when uſed to deſtroy liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiouſneſs and deſpotiſm are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconſiſtent with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other difference between them, than that the one is the licentiouſneſs of *great* men, and the other the licentiouſneſs of *little* men; or that, by the one, the perſons and property of a people are ſubject to outrage and invaſion from a King, or a lawleſs body of *Grandees*; and that, by the other, they are ſubject to the like outrage from a *lawleſs mob*——In avoiding one of theſe evils, mankind have often run into the other. But all well-conſtituted governments guard equally againſt both. Indeed of the two, the laſt is, on ſeveral accounts, the leaſt to be dreaded, and has done the leſs miſchief. It may be truly ſaid, that if licentiouſneſs has deſtroyed its thouſands, deſpotiſm has deſtroyed its millions. The former, having little power, and no ſyſtem to ſupport it, neceſſarily finds its own remedy; and a people ſoon get out of the tumult and anarchy attending it. But a deſpotiſm, wearing the form of government, and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without dreadful ſtruggles. It goes on from age to age, debaſing the human faculties, levelling all diſtinctions, and preying on the rights and bleſſings of ſociety.——It deſerves to be added, that in a ſtate diſturbed by licentiouſneſs, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a ſtate habituated to a deſpotiſm; all is ſtill and torpid. A dark and ſavage tyranny ſtifles every effort of genius; and the mind loſes all its ſpirit and dignity.

Before I proceed to what I have farther in view, I will obſerve, that the account now given of the principles of public Liberty, and the nature of an equal and free government, ſhews what judgment we ſhould form of that OMNIPOTENCE, which, it has been ſaid, muſt belong to every government as ſuch. Great ſtreſs has been laid on this, but moſt unreaſonably.———Government, as has been before obſerved, is, in the very nature of it, a TRUST; and all its powers a DELEGATION for gaining particular ends. This *truſt* may be miſapplied and abuſed. It may be employed to defeat the very ends for which it was inſtituted; and to ſubvert the very rights which it ought to protect.——A PARLIAMENT, for inſtance, conſiſting of a body of repreſentatives, choſen for a limited period, to make laws, and to grant money for public ſervices, would forfeit its authority by making itſelf perpetual, or even prolonging its own

own duration; by nominating its own members; by accepting bribes; or ſubjecting itſelf to any kind of foreign influence. This would convert a *Parliament* into a *conclave* or *junto* of ſelf-created tools; and a ſtate that has loſt its regard to its own rights, ſo far as to ſubmit to ſuch a breach of truſt in its rulers, is enſlaved.——Nothing, therefore, can be more abſurd than the doctrine which ſome have taught, with reſpect to the omnipotence of parliaments. They poſſeſs no power beyond the limits of the truſt for the execution of which they were formed. If they contradict this truſt, they betray their conſtituents, and diſſolve themſelves. All delegated power muſt be ſubordinate and limited.——If omnipotence can, with any ſenſe, be aſcribed to a legiſlature, it muſt be lodged where all legiſlative authority originates; that is, in the PEOPLE. For *their* ſakes government is inſtituted; and their's is the only real omnipotence.

I am ſenſible, that all I have been ſaying would be very abſurd, were the opinions juſt which ſome have maintained concerning the origin of government. According to theſe opinions, government is not the creature of the people, or the reſult of a convention between them and their rulers: But there are certain men who poſſeſs in themſelves, independently of the will of the people, a right of governing them, which they derive from the Deity. This doctrine has been abundantly refuted by many (*a*) excellent writers. It is a doctrine which avowedly ſubverts Civil Liberty; and which repreſents mankind as a body of vaſſals, formed to deſcend like cattle from one ſet of owners to another, who have an abſolute dominion over them. It is a wonder, that thoſe who view their ſpecies in a light ſo humiliating, ſhould ever be able to think of themſelves without regret and ſhame. The intention of theſe obſervations is not to oppoſe ſuch ſentiments; but, taking for granted the reaſonableneſs of Civil Liberty, to ſhew wherein it conſiſts, and what diſtinguiſhes it from its contrary.——And, in conſidering this ſubject, as it has been now treated, it is unavoidable to reflect on the excellency of a free government, and its tendency to exalt the nature of man. ——Every member of a free ſtate, having his property ſecure, and knowing himſelf his own governor, poſſeſſes a conſciouſneſs of dignity in himſelf, and feels incitements to emulation and improvement, to which the miſerable ſlaves of arbitrary power muſt be utter ſtrangers. In ſuch a ſtate all the ſprings of action have room to operate, and the mind is ſtimulated to the nobleſt exertions (*b*).—But to be obliged, from our birth, to look up to a creature no better than ourſelves as the maſter of our fortunes; and to receive his will as our law—What can be more humiliating? What elevated ideas can enter a mind in ſuch a ſituation?——Agreeably to this remark; the ſubjects of free ſtates have, in all ages, been moſt diſtinguiſhed for genius and knowledge. Liberty is the ſoil where the arts and ſciences have flouriſhed; and the more free a ſtate has been, the more have the powers of the human mind been drawn forth into action, and the greater number of brave men has it produced. With what luſtre do the antient free ſtates of *Greece* ſhine in the annals of the world? How different is that country now, under the Great *Turk*? The difference between a country inhabited by men, and by brutes, is not greater.

Theſe are reflexions which ſhould be conſtantly preſent to every mind in this country.—As *Moral* Liberty is the prime bleſſing of man in his *private* capacity, ſo is *Civil* Liberty in his *public* capacity. There is nothing that requires more to be *watched* than power. There is nothing that ought to be oppoſed with a more determined reſolution than its encroachments. Sleep in a ſtate, as *Monteſquieu* ſays, is always followed by ſlavery.

(*a*) See among others Mr. Locke on Government, and Dr. Prieſtley's Eſſay on the firſt Principles of Government.

(*b*) See Dr. Prieſtley on Government, page 68, 69, &c.

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The people of this kingdom were once warmed by ſuch ſentiments as theſe. Many a ſycophant of power have they ſacrificed. Often have they fought and bled in the cauſe of Liberty. But that time ſeems to be going. The fair inheritance of Liberty left us by our anceſtors many of us are not unwilling to reſign. An abandoned venality, the inſeparable companion of diſſipation and extravagance, has poiſoned the ſprings of public virtue among us: And ſhould any events ever ariſe that ſhould render the ſame oppoſition neceſſary that took place in the times of King *Charles* the Firſt, and *James* the Second, I am afraid all that is valuable to us would be loſt. The terror of the ſtanding army, the danger of the public funds, and the all-corrupting influence of the treaſury, would deaden all zeal, and produce general acquieſcence and ſervility.

SECT. III. *Of the Authority of one Country over another.*

FROM the nature and principles of Civil Liberty, as they have been now explained, it is an immediate and neceſſary inference, that no one community can have any power over the property or legiſlation of another community, that is not incorporated with it by a juſt and adequate repreſentation.—Then only, it has been ſhewn, is a ſtate *free*, when it is governed by its own will. But a country that is ſubject to the legiſlature of another country, in which it has no voice, and over which it has no controul, cannot be ſaid to be governed by its own will. Such a country, therefore, is in a ſtate of ſlavery. And it deſerves to be particularly conſidered, that ſuch a ſlavery is worſe, on ſeveral accounts, than any ſlavery of private men to one another, or of kingdoms to deſpots within themſelves.—Between one ſtate and another, there is none of that fellow-feeling that takes place between perſons in private life. Being detached bodies that never ſee one another, and reſiding perhaps in different quarters of the globe, the ſtate that governs cannot be a witneſs to the ſufferings occaſioned by its oppreſſions; or a competent judge of the circumſtances and abilities of the people who are governed. They muſt alſo have in a great degree ſeparate intereſts; and the more the one is loaded, the more the other may be eaſed. The infamy likewiſe of oppreſſion, being in ſuch circumſtances ſhared among a multitude, is not likely to be much felt or regarded.——On all theſe accounts there is, in the caſe of one country ſubjugated to another, little or nothing to check rapacity; and the moſt flagrant injuſtice and cruelty may be practiſed without remorſe or pity.——I will add, that it is particularly difficult to ſhake off a tyranny of this kind. A ſingle deſpot, if a people are unanimous and reſolute, may be ſoon ſubdued. But a deſpotic ſtate is not eaſily ſubdued; and a people ſubject to it cannot emancipate themſelves without entering into a dreadful, and, perhaps, very unequal conteſt.

I cannot help obſerving farther, that the ſlavery of a people to internal deſpots may be qualified and limited; but I don't ſee what can limit the authority of one ſtate over another. The exerciſe of power in this caſe can have no other meaſure than diſcretion; and, therefore, muſt be indefinite and abſolute.

Once more. It ſhould be conſidered that the government of one country by another, can only be ſupported by a military force; and, without ſuch a ſupport, muſt be deſtitute of all weight and efficiency.

This will be beſt explained by putting the following caſe.——There is, let us ſuppoſe, in a province ſubject to the ſovereignty of a diſtant ſtate, a ſubordinate legiſlature conſiſting of an Aſſembly choſen by the people; a Council choſen by that Aſſembly; and a Governor *appointed* by the Sovereign State, and paid by the Province. There are likewiſe, judges and other officers, appointed and paid in the ſame manner, for adminiſtering *juſtice* agreeably to the laws, by the verdicts of juries fairly and indiſcriminately choſen. This forms a conſtitution ſeemingly free, by giving the people a ſhare in their own government,

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and ſome check on their rulers. But, while there is a higher legiſlative power, to the controul of which ſuch a conſtitution is ſubject, it does not itſelf poſſeſs Liberty, and therefore, cannot be of any uſe as a ſecurity to Liberty; nor is it poſſible that it ſhould be of long duration. Laws offenſive to the Province will be enacted by the Sovereign State. The legiſlature of the Province will remonſtrate againſt them. The magiſtrates will not execute them. Juries will not convict upon them; and conſequently, like the Pope's Bulls which once governed *Europe*, they will become nothing but forms and empty ſounds, to which no regard will be ſhewn.—In order to remedy this evil, and to give efficiency to its government, the ſupreme ſtate will naturally be led to withdraw the *Governor*, the *Council*, and the *Judges (a)* from the controul of the Province, by making them entirely dependent on itſelf for their *pay* and *continuance in office*, as well as for their appointment. It will alſo alter the mode of chuſing Juries on purpoſe to bring them more under its influence: And in ſome caſes, under the pretence of the impoſſibility of gaining an impartial trial where government is reſiſted, it will perhaps ordain, that offenders ſhall be removed from the Province to be tried within its own territories: And it may even go ſo far in this kind of policy, as to endeavour to prevent the effects of diſcontents, by forbidding all meetings and aſſociations of the people, except at ſuch times, and for ſuch particular purpoſes, as ſhall be permitted them.

Thus will ſuch a Province be exactly in the ſame ſtate that *Britain* would be in, were our firſt executive magiſtrate, our Houſe of Lords, and our Judges, nothing but the inſtruments of a foreign democratical power; were our Juries nominated by that power; or were we liable to be tranſported to a diſtant country to be tried for offences committed here; and reſtrained from calling any meetings, conſulting about any grievances, or aſſociating for any purpoſes, except when leave ſhould be given us by a *Lord Lieutenant* or *Viceroy*.

It is certain that this is a ſtate of oppreſſion which no country could endure, and to which it would be vain to expect, that any people ſhould ſubmit an hour without an armed force to compel them.

The late tranſactions in *Maſſachuſett's Bay* are a perfect exemplification of what I have now ſaid. The government of *Great Britain* in that Province has gone on exactly in the train I have deſcribed; till at laſt it became neceſſary to ſtation troops there, not amenable to the civil power; and all terminated in a government by the SWORD. And ſuch, if a people are not ſunk below the character of men, will be the iſſue of all government in ſimilar circumſtances.

It may be aſked—"Are there not cauſes by which one ſtate may acquire a "*rightful* authority over another, though not conſolidated by an adequate Re-

(a) The independency of the Judges we eſteem in this country one of our greateſt privileges.—Before the revolution they generally, I believe, held their places *during pleaſure*. King William gave them their places *during good behaviour*. At the acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family their places were given them *during good behaviour*, in conſequence of the Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 W. III. C. 2. But an opinion having been entertained by ſome, that though their commiſſions were made under the Act of Settlement to continue, during good behaviour, yet that they determined on the demiſe of the Crown; it was enacted by a ſtatute made in the firſt year of his preſent Majeſty, Chap. 23. "That the commiſſions of Judges for the time being ſhall be, continue, and remain in "full force, during their good behaviour, notwithſtanding the demiſe of his Majeſty, or of any of his "Heirs and Succeſſors;" with a proviſo, "that it may be lawful for his Majeſty, his Heirs and "Succeſſors, to remove any Judge upon the addreſs of both Houſes of Parliament." And by the ſame Statute their ſalaries are ſecured to them during the continuance of their commiſſions: His Majeſty, according to the preamble of the Statute, having been pleaſed to declare from the Throne to both Houſes of Parliament, "That he looked upon the independency and uprightneſs of Judges as "eſſential to the impartial adminiſtration of Juſtice, as one of the beſt ſecurities to the Rights and "Liberties of his loving ſubjects, and as moſt conducive to the honour of his Crown."

A worthy friend and able Lawyer has ſupplied me with this note. It affords, when contraſted with that *dependence* of the Judges which has been thought reaſonable in *America*, a ſad ſpecimen of the different manner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itſelf, and the provinces ſubject to it.

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" preſentation ?"——I anſwer, that there are no ſuch cauſes.——All the cauſes to which ſuch an effect *can* be aſcribed are CONQUEST, COMPACT, or OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED.

Much has been ſaid of the right of *conqueſt*; and hiſtory contains little more than accounts of kingdoms reduced by it under the dominion of other kingdoms, and of the havock it has made among mankind. But the authority derived from hence, being founded on violence, is never *rightful*. The *Roman Republic* was nothing but a faction againſt the general liberties of the world; and had no more right to give law to the Provinces ſubject to it, than thieves have to the property they ſeize, or to the houſes into which they break.——Even in the caſe of a juſt war undertaken by one people to defend itſelf againſt the oppreſſions of another people, conqueſt gives only a right to an indemnification for the injury which occaſioned the war, and a reaſonable ſecurity againſt future injury.

Neither can any ſtate require ſuch an authority over other ſtates in virtue of any *compacts* or *ceſſions*. This is a caſe in which compacts are not binding. *Civil* Liberty is, in this reſpect, on the ſame footing with *Religious* Liberty. As no people can lawfully ſurrender their *Religious* Liberty, by giving up their right of judging for themſelves in religion, or by allowing any human beings to preſcribe to them what faith they ſhall embrace, or what mode of worſhip they ſhall practiſe; ſo neither can any civil ſocieties lawfully ſurrender their *Civil* Liberty, by giving up to any extraneous juriſdiction their power of legiſlating for themſelves and diſpoſing their property. Such a ceſſion, being inconſiſtent with the unalienable rights of human nature, would either not bind at all; or bind only the individuals who made it. This is a bleſſing which no one generation of men can give up for another; and which, when loſt, a people have always a right to reſume.——Had our anceſtors in this country been ſo mad as to have ſubjected themſelves to any foreign Community, we could not have been under any obligation to continue in ſuch a ſtate. And all the nations now in the world who, in conſequence of the tameneſs and folly of their predeceſſors, are ſubject to arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themſelves as ſoon as they can.

If neither *conqueſt* nor *compact* can give ſuch an authority, much leſs can any favours received, or any ſervices performed by one ſtate for another.——Let the favour received be what it will, Liberty is too dear a price for it. A ſtate that has been *obliged* is not, therefore, bound to be *enſlaved*. It ought, if poſſible, to make an adequate return for the ſervices done to it; but to ſuppoſe that it ought to give up the power of governing itſelf, and the diſpoſal of its property, would be to ſuppoſe, that, in order to ſhew its gratitude, it ought to part with the power of ever afterwards exerciſing gratitude.——How much has been done by this kingdom for *Hanover?* But no one will ſay that on this account, we have a right to make the laws of *Hanover*; or even to draw a ſingle penny from it without its own conſent.

After what has been ſaid it will, I am afraid, be trifling to apply the preceding arguments to the caſe of different communities, which are conſidered as different parts of the ſame *Empire*. But there are reaſons which render it neceſſary for me to be explicit in making this application.

What I mean here is juſt to point out the difference of ſituation between communities forming an *Empire*; and particular bodies or claſſes of men forming different parts of a *Kingdom*. Different communities forming an *Empire* have no connexions, which produce a neceſſary reciprocation of intereſts between them. They inhabit different diſtricts, and are governed by different legiſlatures.——On the contrary. The different claſſes of men *within* a *kingdom* are all placed on the ſame ground. Their concerns and intereſts are the ſame; and what is done to one part muſt affect all.——Theſe are ſituations totally different; and a

conſtitution

conſtitution of government that may be conſiſtent with Liberty in one of them, may be entirely inconſiſtent with it in the other. It is, however, certain that, even in the laſt of theſe ſituations, no one part ought to govern the reſt. In order to a fair and equal government, there ought to be a fair and equal repreſentation of all that are governed; and as far as this is wanting in any government, it deviates from the principles of Liberty, and becomes unjuſt and oppreſſive.—— But in the circumſtances of different communities, all this holds with unſpeakably more force. The government of a part in this caſe becomes complete tyranny; and ſubjection to it becomes complete ſlavery.

But ought there not, it is aſked, to exiſt ſomewhere in an *Empire* a ſupreme legiſlative authority over the whole; or a power to controul and bind all the different ſtates of which it conſiſts?——This enquiry has been already anſwered. The truth is, that ſuch a ſupreme controuling power ought to exiſt no-where except in ſuch a SENATE or body of delegates as that deſcribed in page 7; and that the authority or ſupremacy of even this ſenate ought to be limited to the common concerns of the *Empire*.——I think I have proved that the fundamental principles of Liberty neceſſarily require this.

In a word. An *Empire* is a collection of ſtates or communities united by ſome common bond or tye. If theſe ſtates have each of them free conſtitutions of government, and, with reſpect to taxation and internal legiſlation, are independent of the other ſtates, but united by compacts, or alliances, or ſubjection to a Great *Council*, repreſenting the whole, or to one monarch entruſted with the ſupreme executive power: In theſe circumſtances, the Empire will be an Empire of Freemen.——If, on the contrary, like the different provinces ſubject to the *Grand Seignior*, none of the ſtates poſſeſs any independent legiſlative authority; but are all ſubject to an abſolute monarch, whoſe will is their law, then is the Empire an Empire of Slaves.——If one of the ſtates is free, but governs by its will all the other ſtates; then is the Empire, like that of the Romans in the times of the republic, an Empire conſiſting of one ſtate free, and the reſt in ſlavery: Nor does it make any more difference in this caſe, that the governing ſtate is itſelf free, than it does in the caſe of a kingdom ſubject to a *deſpot*, that this deſpot is himſelf free. I have before obſerved, that this only makes the ſlavery worſe. There is, in the one caſe, a chance, that in the quick ſucceſſion of deſpots, a good one will ſometimes ariſe. But bodies of men continue the ſame; and have generally proved the moſt unrelenting of all tyrants.

A great writer before (*a*) quoted, obſerves of the *Roman Empire*, that while Liberty was at the center, tyranny prevailed in the diſtant provinces; that ſuch as were free under it were extremely ſo, while thoſe who were ſlaves groaned under the extremity of ſlavery; and that the ſame events that *deſtroyed* the liberty of the former, *gave* liberty to the latter.

The Liberty of the *Romans*, therefore, was only an additional calamity to the provinces governed by them; and though it might have been ſaid of the *citizens* of *Rome*, that they were the "freeſt members of any civil ſociety in the known "world;" yet of the *ſubjects* of *Rome*, it muſt have been ſaid, that they were the completeſt ſlaves in the known world.——How remarkable is it, that this very people, once the freeſt of mankind, but at the ſame time the moſt proud and tyrannical, ſhould become at laſt the moſt contemptible and abject ſlaves that ever exiſted?

(*a*) Monteſquieu's Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book 11. C. xix.

PART

PART II.

IN the foregoing diſquiſitions, I have, from one leading principle, deduced a number of conſequences, that ſeems to me incapable of being diſputed. I have meant that they ſhould be applied to the great queſtion between this kingdom and the Colonies which has occaſioned the preſent war with them.

It is impoſſible but my readers muſt have been all along making this application; and if they ſtill think that the claims of this kingdom are reconcilable to the principles of true liberty and legitimate government, I am afraid, that nothing I ſhall farther ſay will have any effect on their judgments. I wiſh, however, they would have the patience and candour to go with me, and grant me a hearing ſome time longer.

Though clearly decided in my own judgment on this ſubject, I am inclined to make great allowances for the different judgments of others. We have been ſo uſed to ſpeak of the Colonies as *our* Colonies, and to think of them as in a ſtate of ſubordination to us, and as holding their exiſtence in *America* only for our uſe, that it is no wonder the prejudices of many are alarmed, when they find a different doctrine maintained. The meaneſt perſon among us is diſpoſed to look upon himſelf as having a body of ſubjects in *America*; and to be offended at the denial of his right to make laws for them, though perhaps he does not know what colour they are of, or what language they talk———Such are the natural prejudices of this country.———But the time is coming, I hope, when the unreaſonableneſs of them will be ſeen; and more juſt ſentiments prevail.

Before I proceed, I beg it may be attended to, that I have choſen to try this queſtion by the general principles of Civil Liberty; and not by the practice of former times; or by the *Charters* granted the colonies.——The arguments *for* them, drawn from theſe laſt topics, appear to me greatly to outweigh the arguments *againſt* them. But I wiſh to have this queſtion brought to a higher teſt, and ſurer iſſue. The queſtion with all liberal enquirers ought to be, not what juriſdiction over them *Precedents*, *Statutes*, and *Charters* give, but what reaſon and equity, and the rights of humanity give.——This is, in truth, a queſtion which no kingdom has ever before had occaſion to agitate. The caſe of a free country branching itſelf out in the manner *Britain* has done, and ſending to a diſtant world colonies which have there, from ſmall beginnings, and under free legiſlatures of their own, increaſed, and formed a body of powerful ſtates, likely ſoon to become ſuperior to the parent ſtate—This is a caſe which is new in the hiſtory of mankind; and it is extremely improper to judge of it by the rules of any narrow and partial policy; or to conſider it on any other ground than the general one of reaſon and juſtice.——Thoſe who will be candid enough to judge on this ground, and who can diveſt themſelves of national prejudices, will not, I fancy, remain long unſatisfied.———But alas! Matters are gone too far. The diſpute probably muſt be ſettled another way; and the ſword alone, I am afraid, is now to determine what the rights of *Britain* and *America* are.——Shocking ſituation!—Deteſted be the meaſures which have brought us into it: And, if we are endeavouring to enforce injuſtice, curſed will be the war.———A retreat, however, is not yet impracticable. The duty we owe our gracious ſovereign obliges us to rely on his diſpoſition to ſtay the ſword, and to promote the happineſs of all the different parts of the Empire at the head of which he is placed. With ſome hopes, therefore, that it may not be too late to reaſon on this ſubject, I will, in the following Sections, enquire what the war with *America* is in the following reſpects.

1. In reſpect of Juſtice.
2. The Principles of the Conſtitution.
3. In reſpect of Policy and Humanity.
4. The Honour of the Kingdom.

And laſtly, The Probability of ſucceeding in it.

SECT. I. *Of the Juſtice of the War with America.*

THE enquiry, whether the war with the Colonies is a *juſt* war, will be beſt determined by ſtating the power over them, which it is the end of the war to maintain: And this cannot be better done, than in the words of an act of parliament, made on purpoſe to define it. That act, it is well known, declares, "That this kingdom has power, and of right ought to have power to "make laws and ſtatutes to bind the Colonies, and people of *America*, in all "caſes whatever."——Dreadful power indeed! I defy any one to expreſs ſlavery in ſtronger language. It is the ſame with declaring "that we have a "right to do with them what we pleaſe."—— I will not waſte my time by applying to ſuch a claim any of the preceding arguments. If my reader does not feel more in this caſe, than words can expreſs, all reaſoning muſt be vain.

But, probably, moſt perſons will be for uſing milder language; and for ſaying no more than, that the united legiſlatures of *England* and *Scotland* have of right power to tax the Colonies, and a ſupremacy of legiſlation over *America*. —— But this comes to the ſame. If it means any thing, it means, that the property, and the legiſlations of the Colonies, are ſubject to the abſolute diſcretion of *Great Britain*, and ought of right to be ſo. The nature of the thing admits of no limitation. The Colonies can never be admitted to be judges, how far the authority over them in theſe caſes ſhall extend. This would be to deſtroy it entirely.——If *any* part of their property is ſubject to our diſcretion, the whole muſt be ſo. If we have a right to interfere at all in their internal legiſlations, we have a right to interfere as far as we think proper.——It is ſelf-evident, that this leaves them nothing they can call *their own*.——And what is it that can give to any people ſuch a ſupremacy over another people?——I have already examined the principal anſwers which have been given to this enquiry. But it will not be amiſs in this place to go over ſome of them again.

It has been urged, that ſuch a right muſt be lodged ſomewhere, "in order to "preſerve the UNITY of the Britiſh Empire."

Pleas of this ſort have, in all ages, been uſed to juſtify tyranny. —— They have in RELIGION given riſe to numberleſs oppreſſive claims, and ſlaviſh Hierarchies. And in the *Romiſh Communion* particularly, it is well known, that the POPE claims the title and powers of the ſupreme head on earth of the Chriſtian church, in order to preſerve its UNITY.——With reſpect to the *Britiſh Empire*, nothing can be more prepoſterous than to endeavour to maintain its unity, by ſetting up ſuch a claim. This is a method of eſtabliſhing unity, which, like the ſimilar method in religion, can produce nothing but diſcord and miſchief.—— The truth is, that a common relation to one ſupreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices; tyes of intereſt and affection, and *compacts*, are ſufficient to give the Britiſh Empire all the unity that is neceſſary. But if not——If, in order to preſerve its *Unity*, one half of it muſt be enſlaved to the other half, let it, in the name of God, want Unity.

Much has been ſaid of "the *Superiority* of the Britiſh State." But what gives us our ſuperiority?—Is it our *Wealth?*—This never confers real dignity. On the contrary: Its effect is always to debaſe, intoxicate, and corrupt.—— Is it the *number of our people?* The colonies will ſoon be equal to us in number.—— Is it our *Knowledge* and *Virtue?* They are probably *equally* knowing, and

and *more* virtuous. There are names among them that will not ſtoop to any names among the philoſophers and politicians of this iſland.

" But we are the PARENT STATE."—Theſe are the magic words which have faſcinated and miſled us. ——The Engliſh came from *Germany*. Does that give the *German* ſtates a right to tax us?——Children, having no property, and being incapable of guiding themſelves, the Author of nature has committed the care of them to their parents, and ſubjected them to their abſolute authority. But there is a period when, having acquired property, and a capacity of judging for themſelves, they become independent agents; and when, for this reaſon, the authority of their parents ceaſes, and becomes nothing but the reſpect and influence due to benefactors. Suppoſing, therefore, that the order of nature in eſtabliſhing the relation between parents and children, ought to have been the rule of our conduct to the Colonies, we ſhould have been gradually relaxing our authority as they grew up. But, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the very time when our authority ſhould have been moſt relaxed, we have carried it to the greateſt extent, and exerciſed it with the greateſt rigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to remember, that they are not Children.

" But we have," it is ſaid, " protected them, and run deeply in debt on their " account."——The full anſwer to this has been already given, (page 13.) Will any one ſay, that all we have done for them has not been more on our *own* account, (*a*) than on *theirs*? ——But ſuppoſe the contrary. Have they done nothing for us? Have they made no compenſation for the protection they have received? Have they not helped us to pay our *taxes*, to ſupport our poor, and to bear the burthen of our debts, by taking from us, at our own price, all the commodities with which we can ſupply them?——Have they not, for our advantage, ſubmitted to many reſtraints in acquiring property? Muſt they likewiſe reſign to us the diſpoſal of that property?—Has not their excluſive trade with us been for many years one of the chief ſources of our national wealth and power?—In all our wars have they not fought by our ſide, and contributed much to our ſucceſs? In the laſt war, particularly, it is well known, that they ran themſelves deeply in debt; and that the parliament thought it neceſſary to grant them conſiderable ſums annually as compenſations for going beyond their abilities in aſſiſting us. And in this courſe would they have continued for many future years; perhaps, for ever.—In ſhort; were an accurate account ſtated, it is by no means certain which ſide would appear to be moſt indebted. When aſked as *freemen*, they have hitherto ſeldom diſcovered any reluctance in giving. But, in obedience to a demand, and with the bayonet at their breaſts, they will give us nothing but blood.

It is farther ſaid, " that the land on which they ſettled was ours."—But how came it to be ours? If ſailing along a coaſt can give a right to a country, then might the people of *Japan* become, as ſoon as they pleaſe, the proprietors of *Britain*. Nothing can be more chimerical than property founded on ſuch a reaſon. If the land on which the Colonies firſt ſettled had any proprietors, they were the natives. The greateſt part of it they bought of the natives. They

(*a*) This is particularly true of the *bounties* granted on ſome American commodities (as pitch, tar, indigo, &c.) when imported into *Britain*; for it is well known, that the end of granting them was, to get thoſe commodities cheaper from the Colonies, and in return for our manufactures, which we uſed to get from *Ruſſia* and other foreign countries. And this is expreſſed in the preambles of the laws which grant theſe bounties. See the Appeal to the Juſtice, &c. page 21, third edition. It is, therefore, ſtrange that Doctor TUCKER and others, ſhould have inſiſted ſo much upon theſe bounties as favours and indulgences to the Colonies.——But it is ſtill more ſtrange, that the ſame repreſentation ſhould have been made of the compenſations granted them for doing more during the laſt war in aſſiſting us than could have been reaſonably expected; and alſo of the ſums we have ſpent in maintaining troops among them *without* their conſent; and in oppoſition to their wiſhes.——See a pamphlet, intitled " The rights of Great Britain aſſerted againſt the claims of " America."

have ſince cleared and cultivated it; and, without any help from us, converted a wilderneſs into fruitful and pleaſant fields. It is, therefore, now on a double account their property; and no power on earth can have any right to diſturb them in the poſſeſſion of it, or to take from them, without their conſent, any part of its produce.

But let it be granted that the land was ours. Did they not ſettle upon it under the faith of charters, which promiſed them the enjoyment of all the rights of *Engliſhmen*; and allowed them to tax themſelves, and to be governed by legiſlatures of their own, ſimilar to ours? Theſe charters were given them by an authority, which at the time was thought competent; and they have been rendered ſacred by an acquieſcence on our part for more than a century. Can it then be wondered at, that the Colonies ſhould revolt, when they found their charters violated; and an attempt made to force INNOVATIONS upon them by famine and the ſword?——But I lay no ſtreſs on charters. They derive their rights from a higher ſource. It is inconſiſtent with common ſenſe to imagine, that any people would ever think of ſettling in a diſtant country, on any ſuch condition, as that the people from whom they withdrew, ſhould for ever be maſters of their property, and have power to ſubject them to any modes of government they pleaſed. And had there been expreſs ſtipulations to this purpoſe in all the charters of the colonies, they would, in my opinion, be no more bound by them, than if it had been ſtipulated with them, that they ſhould go naked, or expoſe themſelves to the incurſions of wolves and tigers.

The defective ſtate of the repreſentation of this kingdom has been farther pleaded to prove our right to tax *America*. *We* ſubmit to a parliament that does not repreſent us, and therefore *they* ought.——How ſtrange an argument is this? It is ſaying we want liberty; and therefore, they ought to want it.——Suppoſe it true, that they are indeed contending for a better conſtitution of government, and more liberty than we enjoy: Ought this to make us angry?——Who is there that does not ſee the danger to which this country is expoſed?——Is it generous, becauſe we are in a ſink, to endeavour to draw them into it? Ought we not rather to wiſh earneſtly, that there may at leaſt be ONE FREE COUNTRY left upon earth, to which we may fly, when venality, luxury, and vice have completed the ruin of Liberty here?

It is, however, by no means true, that *America* has no more right to be exempted from taxation by the *Britiſh* parliament, than *Britain* itſelf.——*Here*, all freeholders, and burgeſſes in boroughs, are repreſented. *There*, not one *Freeholder*, or any other perſon, is repreſented.——*Here*, the *aids* granted by the repreſented part of the kingdom muſt be proportionably *paid* by themſelves; and the laws they make for *others*, they at the ſame time make for *themſelves*. *There*, the aids they would grant would not be *paid*, but *received*, by themſelves; and the laws they made would be made for *others only*.——In ſhort. The relation of one country to another country, whoſe repreſentatives have the power of taxing it (and of appropriating the money raiſed by the taxes) is much the ſame with the relation of a country to a ſingle deſpot, or a body of deſpots, within itſelf, inveſted with the like power. In both caſes, the people taxed and thoſe who tax have ſeparate intereſts; nor can there be any thing to check oppreſſion, beſides either the abilities of the people taxed, or the humanity of the *taxers*.——But indeed I can never hope to convince that perſon of any thing, who does not ſee an eſſential difference *(a)* between the two caſes now mentioned; or between the circumſtances of individuals, and claſſes of men, making parts of a community imperfectly repreſented in the legiſlature

(*a*) It gives me pleaſure to find, that the author of the *Remarks on the Principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain*, &c. acknowledges this difference.——It has, however, been at the ſame time mortifying to me to find ſo able a writer adopting ſuch principles of government, as are contained in this work. According to him, a people have no property or rights, except ſuch as their *Civil Governors* are pleaſed not to take from them. Taxes, therefore, he aſſerts, are in no ſenſe the *gifts*, much leſs the *free gifts* of the people. See p. 58. and 191.

that

that governs it; and the circumſtances of a whole community, in a diſtant world, not at all repreſented.

But enough has been ſaid by others on this point; nor is it poſſible for me to throw any new light upon it. To finiſh, therefore, what I meant to offer under this head, I muſt beg that the following conſiderations may be particularly attended to.

The queſtion now between us and the Colonies is, Whether, in reſpect of taxation and internal legiſlation, they are bound to be ſubject to the juriſdiction of this kingdom: Or, in other words, Whether the *Britiſh* parliament has or has not of right a power to diſpoſe of their property, and to model as it pleaſes their governments?——To this ſupremacy over them, we ſay, we are entitled; and in order to maintain it, we have begun the preſent war.——Let me here enquire,

1ſt. Whether, if we have now this ſupremacy, we ſhall not be equally entitled to it in any future time?——They are now but little ſhort of half our number. To this number they have grown, from a ſmall body of original ſettlers, by a very rapid increaſe. The probability is, that they will go on to increaſe; and that, in 50 or 60 years, they will be *double* our number; *(a)* and form a mighty Empire, conſiſting of a variety of ſtates, all equal or ſuperior to ourſelves in all the arts and accompliſhments, which give dignity and happineſs to human life. In that period, will they be ſtill bound to acknowledge that ſupremacy over them which we now claim? Can there be any perſon who will aſſert this; or whoſe mind does not revolt at the idea of a vaſt continent, holding all that is valuable to it, at the diſcretion of a handful of people on the other ſide the *Atlantic?*——But if, at that period, this would be unreaſonable; what makes it otherwiſe *now?*—Draw the line, if you can.—But there is a ſtill greater difficulty.

Britain is now, I will ſuppoſe, the ſeat of Liberty and Virtue; and its legiſlature conſiſts of a body of able and independent men, who govern with wiſdom and juſtice. The time may come when all will be reverſed: When its excellent conſtitution of Government will be ſubverted: When, preſſed by debts and taxes, it will be greedy to draw to itſelf an increaſe of revenue from every diſtant Province, in order to eaſe its own burdens: When the influence of the crown, ſtrengthened by luxury and an univerſal profligacy of manners, will have tainted every heart, broken down every fence of Liberty, and rendered us a nation of tame and contented vaſſals: When a General *Election* will be nothing but a General *Auction* of *Boroughs:* And when the PARLIAMENT, the Grand Council of the nation, and once the faithful guardian of the ſtate, and a terror to evil miniſters, will be degenerated into a body of *Sycophants*, dependent and venal, always ready to confirm *any* meaſures; and little more than a public court for regiſtering royal edicts.—Such, it is poſſible, may, ſome time or other, be the ſtate of *Great Britain.*—What will, at that period, be the duty of the Colonies? Will they be ſtill bound to unconditional ſubmiſſion? Muſt they always continue an appendage to our government; and follow it implicitly through every change that can happen to it?—Wretched condition, indeed, of millions of freemen as good as ourſelves!—Will you ſay that we now govern equitably; and that there is no danger of any ſuch revolution?—Would to God this were true!—But will you not always ſay the ſame? Who ſhall judge whether we govern equitably or not? Can you give the Colonies any *ſecurity* that ſuch a period will never come? Once more.

If we have indeed that power which we claim over the legiſlations, and internal rights of the Colonies, may we not, whenever we pleaſe, ſubject them

(*a*) See Obſervations on Reverſionary Payments, page 207, &c.

to the arbitrary power of the crown?—I do not mean, that this would be a diſadvantageous change: For I have before obſerved, that if a people are to be ſubject to an external power over which they have no command, it is better that power ſhould be lodged in the hands of one man than of a multitude. But many perſons think otherwiſe; and ſuch ought to conſider that, if this would be a calamity, the condition of the Colonies muſt be deplorable.—"A govern-"ment by King, Lords, and Commons, (it has been ſaid) is the perfection of go-"vernment;" and ſo it is, when the Commons are a juſt repreſentation of the people; and when alſo, it is not extended to any diſtant people, or communities, not repreſented. But if this is the *beſt*, a government by a king only muſt be the *worſt*; and every claim implying a right to eſtabliſh ſuch a government among any people muſt be unjuſt and cruel.—It is ſelf-evident, that by claiming a right to alter the conſtitutions of the Colonies, according to our diſcretion, we claim this power: And it is a power that we have thought fit to exerciſe in *one* of our Colonies; and that we have attempted to exerciſe in *another*.—*Canada*, according to the late extenſion of its limits, is a country almoſt as large as half *Europe*; and it may poſſibly come in time to be filled with *Britiſh* ſubjects. The *Quebec* act makes the king of *Great Britain* a deſpot over all that country.—In the Province of *Maſſachuſett's Bay* the ſame thing has been attempted and begun.

The act for BETTER *regulating their government*, paſſed at the ſame time with the *Quebec* act, gives the king the right of appointing, and removing at his pleaſure, the members of one part of the legiſlature; alters the mode of chuſing juries, on purpoſe to bring it more under the influence of the king; and takes away from the province the power of calling any meetings of the people without the king's conſent. (*a*)——The judges, likewiſe, have been made dependent on the king, for their nomination and pay, and continuance in office.—If all this is no more than we have a right to do; may we not go on to aboliſh the houſe of repreſentatives, to deſtroy all trials by juries, and to give up the province abſolutely and totally to the will of the king?——May we not even eſtabliſh popery in the province, as has been lately done in *Canada*, leaving the ſupport of proteſtantiſm to the king's diſcretion?—Can there be any Engliſhman who, were it his own caſe, would not ſooner loſe his heart's blood than yield to claims ſo pregnant with evils, and deſtructive to every thing that can diſtinguiſh a *Freeman* from a *Slave?*

I will take this opportunity to add, that what I have now ſaid, ſuggeſts a conſideration that demonſtrates, on how different a footing the Colonies are with reſpect to our government, from particular bodies of men *within* the kingdom, who happen not to be repreſented. Here, it is impoſſible that the repreſented part ſhould ſubject the unrepreſented part to arbitrary power, without including themſelves. But in the Colonies it is *not* impoſſible. We know that it *has* been done.

SECT. II. *Whether the War with* America *is juſtified by the Principles of the Conſtitution.*

I Have propoſed, in the next place, to examine the war with the Colonies by the principles of the conſtitution.—I know, that it is common to ſay that we are now maintaining the conſtitution in *America*. If this means that we are endeavouring to eſtabliſh our own conſtitution of government there; it is by no means true; nor, were it true, would it be right. They have chartered governments of their own, with which they are pleaſed; and which, if any power on earth may change without their conſent, that power may likewiſe, if it thinks proper, deliver them over to the *Grand Seignior*.——Suppoſe the Colonies of *France* and *Spain* had, by compacts, enjoyed for near a century and a half, free

(*a*) See page 12.

governments

governments open to all the world, and under which they had grown and flouriſhed; what ſhould we think of thoſe kingdoms, were they to attempt to deſtroy their governments, and to force upon them their own mode of government? Should we not applaud any zeal they diſcovered in repelling ſuch an injury?——But the truth is, in the preſent inſtance, that we are not maintaining but violating our own conſtitution in *America*. The eſſence of our conſtitution conſiſts in its independency. There is in this caſe no difference between *ſubjection* and *annihilation*. Did, therefore, the Colonies poſſeſs governments perfectly the ſame with ours, the attempt to ſubject them to ours would be an attempt to ruin them. A free government loſes its nature from the moment it becomes liable to be commanded or altered by any ſuperior power.

But I intended here principally to make the following obſervation.

The fundamental principle of our government is, "The right of a people to "give and grant their own money."——It is of no conſequence, in this caſe, whether we enjoy this right in a proper manner or not. Moſt certainly we do not. It is, however, the *principle* on which our government, as a *free* government, is founded. The *ſpirit* of the conſtitution gives it us: and, however imperfectly enjoyed, we glory in it as our firſt and greateſt bleſſing. It was an attempt to encroach upon this right, in a trifling inſtance, that produced the civil war in the reign of *Charles* the Firſt. Ought not our brethren in *America* to enjoy this right as well as ourſelves? Do the principles of the conſtitution give it us, but deny it to them? Or can we, with any decency, pretend that when we give to the king *their* money, we give him *our own?* (*a*)——What difference does it make, that in the time of *Charles the Firſt* the attempt to take away this right was made by *one man:* but that, in the caſe of *America*, it is made by a body of men?

In a word. This is a war undertaken not only againſt the principles of our own conſtitution; but on purpoſe to deſtroy other ſimilar conſtitutions in *America*; and to ſubſtitute in their room a military force. See page 12.——It is, therefore, a groſs and flagrant violation of the conſtitution.

SECT. III. *Of the Policy of the War with* America.

IN writing the preſent Section, I have entered upon a ſubject of the laſt importance, on which much has been ſaid by other writers with great force, and in the ableſt manner (*b*). But I am not willing to omit any topic which I think of great conſequence, merely becauſe it has already been diſcuſſed: And, with reſpect to this in particular, it will, I believe, be found that ſome of the obſervations on which I ſhall inſiſt, have not been ſufficiently attended to.

The object of this war has been often enough declared to be "maintaining the "ſupremacy of this country over the colonies." I have already enquired how far reaſon and juſtice, the principles of Liberty, and the rights of humanity, entitle us to this ſupremacy. Setting aſide, therefore, now all conſiderations of this kind, I would obſerve, that this ſupremacy is to be maintained, either merely *for its own ſake*, or for the ſake of ſome public intereſt connected with it

(*a*) The author of *Taxation no Tyranny* will undoubtedly aſſert this without heſitation; for in page 69 he compares our preſent ſitution with reſpect to the Colonies to that of the antient *Scythians*, who, upon returning from a war *found themſelves ſhut out of their own* HOUSES *by their* SLAVES.

(*b*) See particularly, a Speech intended to have been ſpoken on the bill for altering the Charter of the Colony of Maſſachuſet's Bay; the *Conſiderations on the Meaſures carrying on with reſpect to the Britiſh Colonies*; the *Two Appeals to the Juſtice and Intereſts of the People*; and the *further Examination* (juſt publiſhed) *of our preſent American Meaſures*, by the Author of the Conſiderations, &c.

and dependent upon it.——If *for its own ſake*; the only object of the war is the extenſion of dominion; and its only motive is the luſt of power.———All government, even *within* a ſtate, becomes tyrannical, as far as it is a needleſs and wanton exerciſe of power; or is carried farther than is abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve the peace and to ſecure the ſafety of the ſtate. This is what an excellent writer calls GOVERNING TOO MUCH; and its effect muſt always be, weakening government by rendering it contemptible and odious. — Nothing can be of more importance, in governing diſtant provinces and adjuſting the claſhing intereſts of different ſocieties, than attention to this remark. In theſe circumſtances it is *particularly* neceſſary to make a ſparing uſe of power, in order to preſerve power.——Happy would it have been for *Great Britain*, had this been remembered by thoſe who have lately conducted its affairs. But our policy has been of another kind. At the period when our authority ſhould have been moſt concealed, it has been brought moſt in view; and, by a progreſſion of violent meaſures, every one of which has increaſed diſtreſs, we have given the world reaſon to conclude, that we are acquainted with no other method of governing than *by force*.—What a ſhocking miſtake?—If our object is power, we ſhould have known better how to uſe it; and our rulers ſhould have conſidered, that freemen will always revolt at the ſight of a naked ſword; and that the complicated affairs of a great kingdom, holding in ſubordination to it a multitude of diſtant communities, all jealous of their rights, and warmed with ſpirits as high as our own, require not only the moſt ſkilful, but the moſt cautious and tender management. The conſequences of a different management we are now feeling. We ſee ourſelves driven among rocks, and in danger of being loſt.

There are the following reaſons which ſeem to make it too probable, that the preſent conteſt with *America* is a conteſt for powe only (*a*), abſtracted from all the advantages connected with it.

1*ſt*. There is a love of power inherent in human nature; and it cannot be uncharitable to ſuppoſe that the nation in general, and the cabinet in particular, are too likely to be influenced by it. What can be more flattering than to look acroſs the *Atlantic*, and to ſee in the boundleſs continent of *America*, increaſing MILLIONS whom we have a right to order as we pleaſe, who hold their property at our diſpoſal, and who have no other law than our will? With what complacency have we been uſed to talk of them as OUR ſubjects?———Is it not the interruption they now give to this pleaſure? Is it not the oppoſition they make to our pride; and not any injury they have done us, that is the ſecret ſpring of our preſent animoſity againſt them?———I wiſh all in this kingdom would examine themſelves carefully on this point. Perhaps, they might find, that they have not known what ſpirit they are of.—Perhaps, they would become ſenſible, that it was a ſpirit of domination, more than a regard to the true intereſt of this country, that lately led ſo many of them, with ſuch ſavage folly, to addreſs the throne for the ſlaughter of their brethren in *America*, if they will not ſubmit to them; and to make offers of their lives and fortunes for that purpoſe.——Indeed, I am perſuaded, that, were pride and the luſt of dominion exterminated from every heart among us, and the humility of Chriſtians infuſed in their room, this quarrel would be ſoon ended.

2*dly*. Another reaſon for believing that this is a conteſt for power only is, that our miniſters have frequently declared, that their object is not to draw a revenue from *America*; and that many of thoſe who are warmeſt for continuing it, repreſent the *American trade* as of no great conſequence.

(*a*) I have heard it ſaid by a perſon in one of the firſt departments of the ſtate, that the preſent conteſt is for DOMINION on the ſide of the Colonies, as well as on ours: And ſo it is, indeed; but with this eſſential difference. *We* are ſtruggling for dominion over OTHERS. *They* are ſtruggling for SELF-dominion: The nobleſt of all bleſſings.

But what deſerves particular conſideration here is, that this is a conteſt from which no advantages can poſſibly be derived.——Not a revenue: For the provinces of America, when deſolated, will afford no revenue; or if they ſhould, the expence of ſubduing them and keeping them in ſubjection will much exceed that revenue. —— Not any of the advantages of trade: For it is a folly, next to infanity, to think trade can be promoted by impoveriſhing our cuſtomers, and fixing in their minds an everlaſting abhorrence of us.—It remains, therefore, that this war can have no other object than the extenſion of power.——Miſerable reflection!——To ſheath our ſwords in the bowels of our brethren, and ſpread miſery and ruin among a happy people, for no other end than to oblige them to acknowledge our ſupremacy. How horrid!—This is the curſed ambition that led a *Cæſar* and an *Alexander*, and many other mad conquerors, to attack peaceful communities, and to lay waſte the earth.

But a worſe principle than even this, influences ſome among us. Pride and the love of dominion are principles hateful enough; but blind reſentment and the deſire of revenge are infernal principles: And theſe, I am afraid, have no ſmall ſhare at preſent in guiding our public conduct. ——— One cannot help indeed being aſtoniſhed at the virulence, with which ſome ſpeak on the preſent occaſion againſt the Colonies.——For, what have they done?—Have they croſſed the ocean and invaded us? Have they attempted to take from us the fruits of our labour, and to overturn that form of government which we hold ſo ſacred?—This cannot be pretended.——On the contrary. This is what we have done to them.——We have tranſported ourſelves to their peaceful retreats, and employed our fleets and armies to ſtop up their ports, to deſtroy their commerce, to ſeize their effects, and to burn their towns. Would we but let them alone, and ſuffer them to enjoy in ſecurity their property and governments, inſtead of diſturbing us, they would thank and bleſs us. And yet it is WE who imagine ourſelves ill-uſed.———The truth is, we expected to find them a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet; and they have diſappointed us. They have riſen in their own defence, and repelled force by force. They deny the plenitude of our power over them; and inſiſt upon being treated as free communities.——— It is THIS that has provoked us; and kindled our governors into rage.

I hope I ſhall not here be underſtood to intimate, that *all* who promote this war are actuated by theſe principles. Some, I doubt not, are influenced by no other principle, than a regard to what they think the juſt authority of this country over its colonies, and to the unity and indiviſibility of the Britiſh Empire. I wiſh ſuch could be engaged to enter thoroughly into the enquiry, which has been the ſubject of the firſt part of this pamphlet; and to conſider, particularly, how different a thing maintaining the authority of government *within* a ſtate is from maintaining the authority of one people over another, already happy in the enjoyment of a government of their own. I wiſh farther they would conſider, that the deſire of maintaining authority is warrantable, only as far as it is the means of promoting ſome end, and doing ſome good; and that, before we reſolve to ſpread famine and fire through a country in order to make it acknowledge our authority, we ought to be aſſured that great advantages will ariſe not only to ourſelves, but to the country we wiſh to conquer.——— That from the preſent conteſt no advantage to ourſelves can ariſe, has been already ſhewn, and will preſently be ſhewn more at large.—That no advantage to the Colonies can ariſe from it, need not, I hope, be ſhewn. It has however been aſſerted, that even *their* good is intended by this war. Many of us are perſuaded, that they will be much happier under our government, than under any government of their own; and that their liberties will be ſafer when held for them by us, than when truſted in their own hands.—How kind is it thus to take upon us the trouble of judging for them what is moſt for their happineſs? Nothing can be kinder except the reſolution we have formed to exterminate them, if they will not ſubmit to our judgment.——

What ſtrange language have I ſometimes heard? By an armed force we are now endeavouring to deſtroy the laws and governments of America; and yet I have heard it ſaid, that we are endeavouring to ſupport law and government there. We are inſiſting upon our right to levy contributions upon them; and to maintain this right, we are bringing upon them all the miſeries a people can endure; and yet it is aſſerted, that we mean nothing but their ſecurity and happineſs.

But I have wandered a little from the point I intended principally to inſiſt upon in this ſection, which is, "the folly, in reſpect of policy, of the meaſures which have brought on this conteſt; and its pernicious and fatal tendency."

The following obſervations will, I believe, abundantly prove this.

1ſt. There are points which are likely always to ſuffer by diſcuſſion. Of this kind are moſt points of authority and prerogative; and the beſt policy is to avoid, as much as poſſible, giving any occaſion for calling them into queſtion.

The Colonies were at the beginning of this reign in the habit of acknowledging our authority, and of allowing us as much power over them as our intereſt required; and more, in ſome inſtances, than we could reaſonably claim. This habit they would have retained: and had we, inſtead of impoſing new burdens upon them, and increaſing their reſtraints, ſtudied to promote their commerce, and to grant them new indulgences, they would have been always growing more attached to us. Luxury, and, together with it, their dependence upon us, and our influence (*a*) in their aſſemblies, would have increaſed, till in time perhaps they would have become as corrupt as ourſelves; and we might have ſucceeded to our wiſhes in eſtabliſhing our authority over them.——But, happily for them, we have choſen a different courſe. By exertions of authority which have alarmed them, they have been put upon examining into the grounds of all our claims, and forced to give up their luxuries, and to ſeek all their reſources within themſelves: And the iſſue is likely to prove the loſs of *all* our authority over them, and of all the advantages connected with it. So little do men in power ſometimes know how to preſerve power; and ſo remarkably does the deſire of extending dominion ſometimes deſtroy it.——Mankind are naturally diſpoſed to continue in ſubjection to that mode of government, be it what it will, under which they have been born and educated. Nothing rouſes them into reſiſtance but groſs abuſes, or ſome particular oppreſſions out of the road to which they have been uſed. And he who will examine the hiſtory of the world will find, there has generally been more reaſon for complaining that they have been too patient, than that they have been turbulent and rebellious.

Our governors, ever ſince I can remember, have been jealous that the Colonies, ſome time or other, would throw off their dependence. This jealouſy was not founded on any of their acts or declarations. They have always, while at *peace* with us, diſclaimed any ſuch deſign; and they have continued to diſclaim it ſince they have been at *war* with us. I have reaſon, indeed, to believe, that independency is, even at this moment, generally dreaded among them as a calamity to which they are in danger of being driven, in order to avoid a greater.—The jealouſy I have mentioned, was, however, natural; and betrayed a ſecret opinion, that the ſubjection in which they were held was more than we could expect them always to endure. In ſuch circumſtances, all poſſible care ſhould have been taken to give them no reaſon for diſcontent; and to preſerve them in ſubjection, by keeping in that line of conduct to which cuſtom had reconciled them, or at leaſt never deviating from it, except with great caution; and particularly, by avoiding all direct attacks on their property and legiſlations. Had we done this, the different intereſts of ſo many ſtates ſcattered over a vaſt continent, joined to our own prudence and moderation, would have enabled us to

(*a*) This has been our policy with reſpect to the people of *Ireland*; and the conſequence is, that we now ſee their parliament as obedient as we can wiſh.

maintain

maintain them in dependence for ages to come.—But inſtead of this, how have we acted?——It is in truth too evident, that our whole conduct, inſtead of being directed by that ſound policy and foreſight which in ſuch circumſtances were abſolutely neceſſary, has been nothing (to ſay the beſt of it) but a ſeries of the blindeſt rigour followed by retractation; a violence followed by conceſſion; of miſtake, weakneſs, and inconſiſtency.———A recital of a few facts, within every body's recollection, will fully prove this.

In the 6th of *George the Second*, an act was paſſed for impoſing certain duties on all foreign ſpirits, melaſſes and ſugars imported into the plantations. In this act, the duties impoſed are ſaid to be GIVEN and GRANTED by the Parliament to the King; and this is the firſt *American* act in which theſe words have been uſed. But notwithſtanding this, as the act had the appearance of being only a regulation of trade, the colonies ſubmitted to it; and a ſmall direct revenue was drawn by it from them.——In the 4th of the preſent reign, many alterations were made in this act, with the declared purpoſe of making proviſion for raiſing a revenue in America. This alarmed the Colonies; and produced diſcontents and remonſtrances, which might have convinced our rulers this was tender ground, on which it became them to tread very gently.——There is, however, no reaſon to doubt but in time they would have ſunk into a quiet ſubmiſſion to this revenue act, as being at worſt only the exerciſe of a power which then they ſeem not to have thought much of conteſting; I mean, the power of taxing them EXTERNALLY.——But before they had time to cool, a worſe provocation was given them; and the STAMP-ACT was paſſed. This being an attempt to tax them INTERNALLY; and a direct attack on their property, by a power which would not ſuffer itſelf to be queſtioned; which eaſed *itſelf* by loading *them*; and to which it was impoſſible to fix any bounds; they were thrown at once, from one end of the continent to the other, into reſiſtance and rage.——Government, dreading the conſequences, gave way; and the Parliament (upon a change of miniſtry) repealed the *Stamp-Act*, without requiring from them any recognition of its authority, or doing any more to preſerve its dignity, than aſſerting, by the declaratory law, that it was poſſeſſed of full power and authority to make laws to bind them in all caſes whatever.—— Upon this, peace was reſtored; and, had no farther attempts of the ſame kind been made, they would undoubtedly have ſuffered us (as the people of *Ireland* have done) to enjoy quietly our declaratory law. They would have recovered their former habits of ſubjection; and our connection with them might have continued an increaſing ſource of our wealth and glory.——But the ſpirit of deſpotiſm and avarice, always blind and reſtleſs, ſoon broke forth again. The ſcheme for drawing a revenue from *America*, by parliamentary taxation, was reſumed; and in a little more than a year after the repeal of the *Stamp Act*, when all was peace, a third act was paſſed, impoſing duties payable in *America* on tea, paper, glaſs, painters colours, &c. ——This, as might have been expected, revived all the former heats; and the Empire was a ſecond time threatened with the moſt dangerous commotions.—— Government receded again; and the Parliament (under another change of miniſtry) repealed all the obnoxious duties, EXCEPT that upon tea. This exception was made in order to maintain a ſhew of dignity. But it was, in reality, ſacrificing ſafety to pride; and leaving a ſplinter in the wound to produce a gangrene.——For ſome time, however, this relaxation anſwered its intended purpoſes. Our commercial intercourſe with the Colonies was again recovered; and they avoided nothing but that tea which we had excepted in our repeal. In this ſtate would things have remained, and even tea would perhaps in time have been gradually admitted, had not the evil genius of *Britain* ſtepped forth once more to embroil the Empire.

The *Eaſt India* company having fallen under difficulties, partly in conſequence of the loſs of the *American* market for tea, a ſcheme was formed for aſſiſting them by an attempt to recover that market. With this view an act was paſſed

paſſed to enable them to export their tea to *America* free of all duties here, and ſubject only to 3d. per pound duty, payable in *America*. By this expedient they were enabled to offer it at a low price; and it was expected the conſequence would prove that the Colonies would be tempted by it; a precedent gained for taxing them, and at the ſame time the company relieved. Ships were, therefore, fitted out; and large cargoes ſent. The ſnare was too groſs to eſcape the notice of the Colonies. They ſaw it, and ſpurned at it. They refuſed to admit the tea; and at BOSTON ſome perſons in diſguiſe buried it in the ſea.——Had our governors in this caſe ſatisfied themſelves with requiring a compenſation from the province for the damage done, there is no doubt but it would have been granted. Or had they proceeded no farther in the infliction of puniſhment, than ſtopping up the port and deſtroying the trade of Boſton, till compenſation was made, the province might poſſibly have ſubmitted, and a ſufficient ſaving would have been gained for the honour of the nation. But having hitherto proceeded without wiſdom, they obſerved now no bounds in their reſentment. To the Boſton port bill was added a bill which deſtroyed the chartered government of the province; a bill which withdrew from the juriſdiction of the province, perſons who in particular caſes ſhould commit murder; and the *Quebec* bill. At the ſame time a ſtrong body of troops was ſtationed at *Boſton* to enforce obedience to theſe bills.

All who knew any thing of the temper of the Colonies ſaw that the effect of all this ſudden accumulation of vengeance, would probably be not intimidating but exaſperating them, and driving them into a general revolt. But our miniſters had different apprehenſions. They believed that the malecontents in the Colony of *Maſſachuſett*'s were a ſmall party, headed by a few factious men; that the majority of the people would take the ſide of government, as ſoon as they ſaw a force among them capable of ſupporting them; that, at worſt, the Colonies in general would never make a common cauſe with this province; and that, the iſſue would prove, in a few months, order, tranquillity, and ſubmiſſion. —Every one of theſe apprehenſions was falſified by the events that followed.

When the bills I have mentioned came to be carried into execution, the whole Province was thrown into confuſion. Their courts of juſtice were ſhut up, and all government was diſſolved. The commander in chief found it neceſſary to fortify himſelf in BOSTON; and the other Colonies immediately reſolved to make a common cauſe with this Colony.

So ſtrangely miſinformed were our miniſters, that this was all a ſurpriſe upon them. They took fright, therefore; and once more made an effort to retreat; but indeed the moſt ungracious one that can well be imagined. A propoſal was ſent to the Colonies, called Conciliatory; and the ſubſtance of which was, that if any of them would raiſe ſuch ſums as ſhould be demanded of them by taxing themſelves, the Parliament would forbear to tax them.——It will be ſcarcely believed, hereafter, that ſuch a propoſal could be thought conciliatory. It was only telling them; "If you will tax yourſelves BY OUR ORDER, we will ſave "ourſelves the trouble of taxing you."——They received the propoſal as an inſult; and rejected it with diſdain.

At the time this conceſſion was tranſmitted to *America*, open hoſtilities were not begun. In the ſword our miniſters thought they had ſtill a reſource which would immediately ſettle all diſputes. They conſidered the people of *New-England* as nothing but a mob, who would be ſoon routed and forced into obedience. It was even believed, that a few thouſands of our army might march through all *America*, and make all quiet wherever they went. Under this conviction our miniſters did not dread urging the Province of *Maſſachuſett's Bay* into rebellion, by ordering the army to ſeize their ſtores, and to take up ſome of their leading men ——The attempt was made.——The people fled immediately to arms, and re-

pelled

pelled the attack.——A conſiderable part of the flower of the Britiſh army has been deſtroyed.——Some of our beſt Generals, and the braveſt of our troops, are now diſgracefully and miſerably impriſoned at *Boſton*.—— A horrid civil war is commenced ;——And the Empire is diſtracted and convulſed.

Can it be poſſible to think with patience of the policy that has brought us into theſe circumſtances ? Did ever Heaven puniſh the vices of a people more ſeverely by darkening their counſels ? How great would be our happineſs could we now recal former times, and return to the policy of the laſt reigns ?—But thoſe times are gone.——I will, however, beg leave for a few moments to look back to them ; and to compare the ground we have left with that on which we find ourſelves. This muſt be done with deep regret ; but it forms a neceſſary part of my preſent deſign.

In thoſe times our Colonies, foregoing every advantage which they might derive from trading with foreign nations, conſented to ſend only to us whatever it was for our intereſt to receive from them ; and to receive only from us whatever it was for our intereſt to ſend to them. They gave up the power of making ſumptuary laws, and expoſed themſelves to all the evils of an increaſing and waſteful luxury, becauſe we were benefited by vending among them the materials of it. The iron with which Providence had bleſſed their country, they were required by laws, in which they acquieſced, to tranſport hither, that our people might be maintained by working it for them into nails, ploughs, axes, &c. And, in ſeveral inſtances, even one Colony was not allowed to ſupply any neighbouring Colonies with commodities, which could be conveyed to them from hence. ——But they yielded much farther. They conſented that we ſhould have the appointment of one branch of their legiſlature. By recognizing as their King, a King reſident among us and under our influence, they gave us a negative on all their laws. By allowing an appeal to us in their civil diſputes, they gave us likewiſe the ultimate determination of all civil cauſes among them.——In ſhort. They allowed us every power we could deſire, except that of taxing them, and interfering in their internal legiſlations : And they had admitted precedents which, even in theſe inſtances, gave us no inconſiderable authority over them. By purchaſing our goods they paid our taxes ; and by allowing us to regulate their trade in any manner we thought moſt for our advantage, they enriched our merchants, and helped us to bear our growing burdens. They fought our battles with us. They gloried in their relation to us. All their gains centered among us ; and they always ſpoke of this country, and looked to it as their home.

Such WAS the ſtate of things.——What is it now ?

Not contented with a degree of power, ſufficient to ſatisfy any reaſonable ambition, we have attempted to extend it.——— Not contented with drawing from them a large revenue *indirectly*, we have endeavoured to procure one *directly* by an authoritative ſeizure ; and, in order to gain a pepper-corn in this way, have choſen to hazard millions, acquired by the peaceable intercourſe of trade.—— Vile policy ! What a ſcourge is government ſo conducted ?——Had we never deſerted our old ground : Had we nouriſhed and favoured *America*, with a view to commerce, inſtead of conſidering it as a country to be governed : Had we, like a liberal and wiſe people, rejoiced to ſee a multitude of free ſtates branched forth from ourſelves, all enjoying independent legiſlatures ſimilar to our own : Had we aimed at binding them to us only by the tyes of affection and intereſt ; and contented ourſelves with a moderate power rendered durable by being lenient and friendly, an umpire in their differences, an aid to them in improving their own free governments, and their common bulwark againſt the aſſaults of foreign enemies : Had this, I ſay, been our policy and temper ; there is nothing ſo great or happy that we might not have expected. With their increaſe our ſtrength would have increaſed. A growing ſurplus in the revenue might have been gained, which, invariably applied to the gradual diſcharge of the national debt, would have

have delivered us from the ruin with which it threatens us. The Liberty of *America* might have preſerved our Liberty; and, under the direction of a patriot king or wiſe miniſter, proved the means of reſtoring to us our almoſt loſt conſtitution. Perhaps, in time, we might alſo have been brought to ſee the neceſſity of carefully watching and reſtricting our paper-credit: And thus we might have regained ſafety; and, in union with our Colonies, have been more than a match for every enemy, and riſen to a ſituation of honour and dignity never before known amongſt mankind.——But I am forgetting myſelf——Our Colonies are likely to be loſt for ever. Their love is turned into hatred; and their reſpect for our government into reſentment and abhorrence.——We ſhall ſee more diſtinctly what a calamity this is, and the obſervations I have now made will be confirmed, by attending to the following facts.

Our American Colonies, particularly the Northern ones, have been for ſome time in the very happieſt ſtate of ſociety; or, in that middle ſtate of civilization, between its firſt rude and its laſt refined and corrupt ſtate. Old countries conſiſt, generally, of three claſſes of people; a GENTRY; a YEOMANRY; and a PEASANTRY. The Colonies conſiſt only of a body of YEOMANRY (*a*) ſupported by agriculture, and all independent, and nearly upon a level; in conſequence of which, joined to a boundleſs extent of country, the means of ſubſiſtence are procured without difficulty, and the temptations to wickedneſs are ſo inconſiderable, that executions (*b*) are ſeldom known among them. From hence ariſes an encouragement to population ſo great, that in ſome of the Colonies they double their own number in fifteen years; in others, in eighteen years; and in all, taken one with another, in twenty-five years.——Such an increaſe was, I believe, never before known. It demonſtrates that they muſt live at their eaſe; and be free from thoſe cares, oppreſſions, and diſeaſes which depopulate and ravage luxurious ſtates.

With the population of the Colonies has increaſed their trade; but much faſter, on account of the gradual introduction of luxury among them. —— In 1723 the exports to *Penſylvania* were 16,000 l.—In 1742 they were 75,295 l.——In 1757 they were increaſed to 268,426 l. and in 1773 to half a million.

The exports to all the Colonies in 1744 were 640,114 l.——In 1758, they were increaſed to 1,832,948 l and in 1773, to three millions. (*c*) And the probability is, that, had it not been for the diſcontents among the Colonies ſince the year 1764, our trade with them would have been this year double to what it was in 1773; and that in a few years more, it would not have been poſſible for the whole kingdom, though conſiſting only of manufacturers, to ſupply the American demand.

This trade, it ſhould be conſidered, was not only thus an increaſing trade; but it was a trade in which we had no rivals; a trade certain, conſtant, and uninterrupted; and which, by the ſhipping employed in it, and the naval ſtores ſupplied by it, contributed greatly to the ſupport of that navy which is our chief national ſtrength.——Viewed in theſe lights it was an object unſpeakably important. But it will appear ſtill more ſo if we view it in its connexions and dependencies. It is well known, that our trade with *Africa* and the *Weſt-*

(*a*) Excepting the *Negroes* in the Southern Colonies, who probably will now either ſoon become extinct, or have their condition changed into that of *Freemen*.——It is not the fault of the Colonies that they have among them ſo many of theſe unhappy people. They have made laws to prohibit the importation of them; but theſe laws have always had a negative put upon them here, becauſe of their tendency to hurt our Negro trade.

(*b*) In the County of Suffolk, where Boſton is, there has not been, I am informed, more than one execution theſe 18 years.

(*c*) Mr. Burke (in his excellent and admirable Speech on moving his reſolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, P. 9, &c.) has ſhewn, that our trade to the Colonies, including that to *Africa* and the *Weſt-Indies*, was in 1772 nearly equal to the trade which we carried on with the whole world at the beginning of this Century.

Indies

Indies cannot eaſily ſubſiſt without it. And, upon the whole, it is undeniable, that it has been one of the main ſprings of our opulence and ſplendour; and that we have, in a great meaſure, been indebted to it for our ability to bear a debt ſo much heavier, than that which, fifty years ago, the wiſeſt men thought would neceſſarily ſink us.

This ineſtimable prize, and all the advantages connected with *America*, we are now throwing away. Experience alone can ſhew what calamities muſt follow. It will indeed be aſtoniſhing if this kingdom can bear ſuch a loſs without dreadful conſequences.——Theſe conſequences have been amply repreſented by others; and it is needleſs to enter into any account of them——At the time we ſhall be feeling them——The Empire diſmembered; the blood of thouſands ſhed in an unrighteous quarrel; our ſtrength exhauſted; our merchants breaking; our manufacturers ſtarving; our debts increaſing; the revenue ſinking; the funds tottering; and all the miſeries of a public bankruptcy impending—— At ſuch a *criſis* ſhould our natural enemies, eager for our ruin, ſeize the opportunity——The apprehenſion is too diſtreſſing.——Let us view this ſubject in another light.

On this occaſion, particular attention ſhould be given to the preſent SINGULAR ſituation of this kingdom. This is a circumſtance of the utmoſt importance; and as I am afraid it is not much conſidered, I will beg leave to give a diſtinct account of it.

At the REVOLUTION, the *ſpecie* of the kingdom amounted, according to (*a*) *Davenant*'s account, to eighteen millions and a half.——From the ACCESSION to the year 1772, there were coined at the mint, near 29 millions of gold; and in ten years only of this time, or from January 1759 to January 1769, there were coined eight millions and a half. (*b*) But it has appeared lately, that the gold ſpecie now left in the kingdom is no more than about twelve millions and a half.——Not ſo much as half a million of *Silver ſpecie* has been coined theſe ſixty years; and it cannot be ſuppoſed, that the quantity of it now in circulation exceeds two or three millions. The whole ſpecie of the kingdom, therefore, is probably at this time about (*c*) fourteen or fifteen millions. Of this ſeveral millions muſt be hoarded at the *Bank*.—Our circulating *ſpecie*, therefore, appears to be greatly decreaſed. But our wealth, or the quantity of money in the kingdom, is greatly increaſed. This is paper to a vaſt amount, iſſued in almoſt every corner of the kingdom; and, particularly, by the BANK OF ENGLAND. While this paper maintains its credit it anſwers all the purpoſes of ſpecie, and is in all reſpects the ſame with money.

Specie repreſents ſome real value in goods or commodities. On the contrary; paper repreſents nothing immediately but ſpecie. It is a promiſe or obligation, which the emitter brings himſelf under to pay a given ſum in coin; and it owes its currency to the credit of the emitter; or to an opinion that he is able to make good his engagement; and that the ſum ſpecified may be received upon being demanded.—Paper, therefore, repreſents coin; and coin repreſents real value. That is, the one is a *ſign* of wealth. The other is a *ſign* of that *ſign*. ——But farther. Coin is an *univerſal* ſign of wealth, and will procure it every where. It will bear any alarm, and ſtand any ſhock.——On the contrary. Paper, owing its currency to opinion, has only a local and imaginary value. It can ſtand no ſhock. It is deſtroyed by the approach of danger; or even the *ſuſpicion* of danger.

In ſhort. Coin is the baſis of our paper-credit; and were it either all deſtroyed, or were only the quantity of it reduced beyond a certain limit, the

(*a*) See Dr. Davenant's works, collected and reviſed by Sir Charles Whitworth, Vol. I. Page 363, &c. 443, &c.

(*b*) See Conſiderations on Money, Bullion, &c. Page 2 and 11.

(*c*) Or nearly the ſame that it was in *Cromwell*'s time. See Dr. Davenant's works, Vol. I. Page 365.

paper

paper circulation of the kingdom would ſink at once. But, were our paper deſtroyed, the coin would not only remain, but riſe in value, in proportion to the quantity of paper deſtroyed.

From this account it follows, that as far as, in any circumſtances, ſpecie is not to be procured in exchange for paper, it repreſents *nothing*, and is worth *nothing*.——The ſpecie of this kingdom is inconſiderable, compared with the amount of the paper circulating in it. This is generally believed; and, therefore, it is natural to enquire how its currency is ſupported.——The anſwer is eaſy. It is ſupported in the ſame manner with all other bubbles. Were all to demand ſpecie in exchange for their notes, payment could not be made; but, at the ſame time that this is known, every one truſts, that no alarm producing ſuch a demand will happen, while he holds the paper he is poſſeſſed of; and that if it ſhould happen, he will ſtand a chance for being firſt paid; and this makes him eaſy. And it alſo makes all with whom he trafficks eaſy.—But let any events happen which threaten danger; and every one will become diffident. A run will take place; and a bankruptcy follow.

This is an account of what *has* often happened in *private* credit. And it is alſo an account of what *will* (if no change of meaſures takes place) happen ſome time or other in *public* credit. The deſcription I have given of our paper-circulation implies, that nothing can be more delicate or hazardous. It is an immenſe fabrick, with its head in the clouds, that is continually trembling with every adverſe blaſt and every fluctuation of trade; and which, like the baſeleſs fabrick of a viſion, may in a moment vaniſh, and leave no wreck behind.—The deſtruction of a few books at the *Bank*; an improvement in the art of forgery; the landing of a body of *French* troops on our coaſts; inſurrections threatening a revolution in government; or any events that ſhould produce a general panic, however groundleſs, would at once annihilate it, and leave us without any other medium of traffic, than a quantity of *ſpecie* ſcarcely equal in amount to the money now drawn from the public by the taxes. It would, therefore, become impoſſible to pay the taxes. The revenue would fail. Near a hundred and forty millions of property would be deſtroyed. The whole frame of government would fall to pieces; and a ſtate of nature would take place.——What a dreadful ſituation? It has never had a parallel among mankind; except at one time in *France* after the eſtabliſhment there of the Royal *Miſſiſſippi* Bank. In 1720 this bank broke (*a*); and, after involving for ſome time the whole kingdom in a golden dream, ſpread through it in one day, deſolation and ruin.——The diſtreſs attending ſuch an event, in this free country, would be greater than it was in *France*. Happily for that kingdom, they have ſhot this gulph. Paper-credit has never ſince recovered itſelf there; and their circulating caſh conſiſts now all of ſolid coin, amounting, I am informed, to no leſs a ſum than 1500 millions of *Livres*; or near 67 millions of pounds ſterling. This gives them unſpeakable advantages; and, joined to that quick reduction of their debts which is inſeparable (*b*) from their nature, places them on a ground of ſafety which we have reaſon to admire and envy.

Theſe are ſubjects on which I ſhould have choſen to be ſilent, did I not think it neceſſary, that this country ſhould be apprized and warned of the danger

(*a*) See Sir James Steuart's Enquiry into the Principles of political Oeconomy, Vol. II. Book 4, Chap. 32.

(*b*) Their debts conſiſt chiefly of money raiſed by annuities on lives, ſhort annuities, anticipations of taxes for ſhort terms, &c. During the whole laſt war they added to their *perpetual* annuities only 12 millions ſterling, according to Sir James Steuart's account; whereas we added to theſe annuities near 60 millions. In conſequence therefore of the nature of their debts, as well as of the management they are now uſing for haſtening the reduction of them, they muſt in a few years, if peace continues, be freed from moſt of their incumbrances; while we probably (if no event comes from that will unburthen us at once, ſhall continue with them all upon us.

which

which threatens it. This danger is created chiefly by the national debt. High taxes are neceſſary to ſupport a great public debt; and a large ſupply of caſh is neceſſary to ſupport high taxes. This caſh we owe to our paper; and, in proportion to our paper, muſt be the productiveneſs of our taxes.——King William's wars drained the kingdom of its ſpecie. This ſunk the revenue, and diſtreſſed government. In 1694 the BANK was eſtabliſhed; and the kingdom was provided with a ſubſtitute for ſpecie. The taxes became again productive. The revenue roſe; and government was relieved.——Ever ſince that period our paper and taxes have been increaſing together, and ſupporting one another; and one reaſon, undoubtedly, of the late increaſe in the productiveneſs of our taxes has been the increaſe of our paper.

Was there no public debt, there would be no occaſion for half the preſent taxes. Our paper-circulation might be reduced. The balance of trade would turn in our favour. Specie would flow in upon us. The quantity of property deſtroyed by a failure of paper-credit (ſhould it in ſuch circumſtances happen) would be 140 millions leſs; and, therefore, the ſhock attending it would be *tolerable*. But, in the preſent ſtate of things, whenever any calamity or panic ſhall produce ſuch a failure, the ſhock attending it will be *intolerable*.——May Heaven ſoon raiſe up for us ſome great ſtateſman who ſhall ſee theſe things; and enter into effectual meaſures, if not now too late, for extricating and preſerving us!

Public banks are, undoubtedly, attended with great conveniencies. But they alſo do great harm; and, if their emiſſions are not reſtrained, and conducted with great wiſdom, they may prove the moſt pernicious of all inſtitutions; not only, by ſubſtituting *fictitious* for *real* wealth; by increaſing luxury; by raiſing the prices of proviſions; by concealing an unfavourable balance of trade; and by rendering a kingdom incapable of bearing any *internal* tumults or *external* attacks, without the danger of a dreadful convulſion: but, particularly, by becoming inſtruments in the hands of miniſters of ſtate to increaſe their influence, to leſſen their dependence on the people, and to keep up a deluſive ſhew of public proſperity, when perhaps, ruin may be near. There is, in truth, nothing that a government may not do with ſuch a mine at its command as a public Bank, while it can maintain its credit; nor, therefore, is there any thing more likely to be IMPROPERLY and DANGEROUSLY uſed.——But to return to what may be more applicable to our own ſtate at preſent.

Among the cauſes that may produce a failure of paper-credit, there are two which the preſent quarrel with *America* calls upon us particularly to conſider.—The firſt is, "An unfavourable balance of trade." This, in proportion to the degree in which it takes place, muſt turn the courſe of foreign exchange againſt us; raiſe the price of bullion; and carry off our ſpecie. The danger to which this would expoſe us is obvious; and it has been much increaſed by the new coinage of the gold ſpecie which begun in 1772. Before this coinage, the greateſt part of our gold coin being light, but the ſame in currency as if it had been heavy, always remained in the kingdom. But, being now full weight, whenever a wrong balance of foreign trade alters the courſe of exchange, and gold in *coin* becomes of leſs value than in *bullion*, there is reaſon to fear, that it will be melted down in ſuch great quantities, and exported ſo faſt, as in a little time to leave none behind; (*a*) the conſequence of which muſt prove, that the whole

ſuperſtructure

(*a*) Mr. *Lowndes* in the diſpute between him and Mr. *Locke*, contended for a reduction of the ſtandard of ſilver. One of his reaſons was, that it would render the ſilver-coin more commenſurate to the wants of the nation; and CHECK HAZARDOUS PAPER-CREDIT.——Mr. CONDUIT, Sir ISAAC NEWTON's ſucceſſor in the mint, has propoſed, in direct contradiction to the laws now in being, that all the bullion imported into the kingdom ſhould be carried into the mint to be coined; and only coin allowed to be exported. "The height, he ſays, of Paper-credit is the ſtrongeſt argument for trying this and *every other* method that is likely to increaſe the coinage. For whilſt "Paper-

ſuperſtructure of paper-credit, now ſupported by it, will break down.——The only remedy, in ſuch circumſtances, is an increaſe of coinage at the mint. But this will operate too ſlowly; and, by raiſing the price of bullion, will only increaſe the evil.—It is the *Bank* that at ſuch a time muſt be the immediate ſufferer: For it is from thence that thoſe who want coin for any purpoſe will always draw it.

For many years before 1772, the price of gold in *bullion* had been from 2 to 3 or 4 *per cent.* higher than in *coin*. This was a temptation to melt down and export the coin, which could not be reſiſted. Hence aroſe a demand for it on the BANK; and, conſequently, the neceſſity of purchaſing bullion at a loſs for a new coinage. But the more coin the Bank procured in this way, the lower its price became in compariſon with that of bullion, and the faſter it vaniſhed; and conſequently, the more neceſſary it became to coin again, and the greater loſs fell upon the Bank.——Had things continued much longer in this train, the conſequences might have proved very ſerious. I am by no means ſufficiently informed to be able to aſſign the cauſes which have produced the change that happened in 1772. But, without doubt, the ſtate of things that took place before that year, muſt be expected to return. The fluctuations of trade, in its beſt ſtate, render this unavoidable. But the conteſt with our Colonies has a tendency to bring it on ſoon: and to increaſe unſpeakably the diſtreſs attending it.

All know that the balance of trade with them is greatly in our favour; (*a*) and that this balance is paid partly by direct remittances of bullion; and partly by circuitous remittances through *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Italy*, &c. which diminiſh the balance againſt us with theſe countries.——During the laſt year, they have been employed in paying their debts, without adding to them; and their exportations and remittances for that purpoſe have contributed to render the general balance of trade more favourable to us, and, alſo, (in conjunction with the late operations of the Bank) to keep up our funds. Theſe remittances are now ceaſed; and a year or two will determine, if this conteſt goes on, how far we can ſuſtain ſuch a loſs without ſuffering the conſequences I have deſcribed.

The ſecond event, ruinous to our paper circulation, which may ariſe from our rupture with *America*, is a deficiency in the revenue. As a failure of our paper would deſtroy the revenue, ſo a failure of the revenue, or any conſiderable diminution of it, would deſtroy our paper. The BANK is the ſupport of our paper; and the ſupport of the BANK is the credit of government. Its principal ſecurities, are a capital of near eleven millions lent to government; and money continually advanced to a vaſt amount on the Land-tax, Sinking fund, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, &c. Should, therefore, deficiencies in the revenue bring government under any difficulties, all theſe ſecurities would loſe their value, and the *Bank* and Government, and all private and public credit, would fall together.——Let any one here imagine, what would probably follow, were it but ſuſpected by the public in general, that the taxes were ſo fallen, as not to produce enough to pay the intereſt of the public debts, beſides bearing the *ordinary* expences of the nation; and that, in order to ſupply the deficiency and to hide the calamity, it had been neceſſary in any one year to anticipate the taxes, and to borrow of the Bank.——In ſuch circumſtances I can ſcarcely doubt, but an alarm would

" Paper-credit does in a great meaſure the buſineſs of money at home, Merchants and Bankers are " not under a neceſſity, as they were formerly, of coining a quantity of ſpecie for their home trade; " and as Paper-credit brings money to the Merchants to be exported, the money may go away in- " ſenſibly, and NOT BE MISSED TILL IT BE TOO LATE: And where Paper-credit is large " and increaſing, if the money be exported and the coinage decreaſe, THAT CREDIT MAY SINK " AT ONCE; for want of a proportionable quantity of *Specie*, which alone can ſupport it in a " time of diſtreſs."——See Mr. *Conduit*'s Obſervations on the ſtate of our Gold and Silver Coins in 1730, Page 36 to 46.

(*a*) According to the accounts of the exports to, and imports from the North-American Colonies, laid before Parliament; the balance in our favour appears to have been, for 11 years before 1774, near a *million and a half* annually.

ſpread

ſpread of the moſt dangerous tendency.——The next foreign war, ſhould it prove *half* as expenſive as the laſt, will probably occaſion ſuch a deficiency; and bring our affairs to that criſis towards which they have been long tending.——But the war with *America* has a greater tendency to do this; and the reaſon is, that it affects our reſources more; and is attended more with the danger of internal diſturbances.

Some have made the proportion of our trade depending on *North America* to be near ONE HALF. A moderate computation makes it a THIRD. (*a*) Let it, however, be ſuppoſed to be only a FOURTH. I will venture to ſay, this is a proportion of our foreign trade, the loſs of which, when it comes to be felt, will be found inſupportable.——In the article of *Tobacco* alone it will cauſe a deduction from the *Cuſtoms* of at leaſt 300,000*l. per ann.* (*b*) including the duties paid on foreign commodities purchaſed by the exportation of tobacco. Let the whole deduction from the revenue be ſuppoſed to be only half a million. This alone is more than the kingdom can at preſent bear, without having recourſe to additional taxes in order to defray the common and neceſſary expences of peace. But to this muſt be added a deduction from the produce of the *Exciſes*, in conſequence of the increaſe of the poor, of the difficulties of our merchants and manufacturers, of leſs national wealth, and a retrenchment of luxury. There is no poſſibility of knowing to what theſe deductions may amount. When the evils producing them begin, they will proceed rapidly; and they may end in a general wreck before we are aware of any danger.

In order to give a clearer view of this ſubject, I will in an Appendix, ſtate particularly the national expenditure and income for eleven years, from 1764 to 1774. From that account it will appear, that the money drawn every year from the public by the taxes, falls but little ſhort of a ſum equal to the whole *ſpecie* of the kingdom; and that, notwithſtanding the late increaſe in the productiveneſs of the taxes, the whole ſurplus of the national income has not exceeded 320,000*l. per ann.* (*c*) This is a ſurplus ſo inconſiderable as to be ſcarcely ſufficient to guard againſt the deficiencies ariſing from the common fluctuations of foreign trade, and of home conſumption. It is NOTHING when conſidered as the only fund we have for paying off a debt of near 140 millions.——Had we continued in a ſtate of profound peace, it could not have admitted of any diminution. What then muſt follow, when one of the moſt profitable branches of our trade is deſtroyed; when a THIRD of the Empire is loſt; when an addition of many millions is made to the public debt; and when, at the ſame time, perhaps, ſome millions are taken away from the revenue?——I ſhudder at this proſpect.——A KINGDOM, ON AN EDGE SO PERILOUS, SHOULD THINK OF NOTHING BUT A RETREAT.

SECT. IV. *Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by the War with* America.

ONE of the pleas for continuing the conteſt with *America*, is "That our "honour is engaged; and that we cannot now recede without the moſt "humiliating conceſſions."

With reſpect to this, it is proper to obſerve, that a diſtinction ſhould be made between the nation, and its rulers. It is melancholy that there ſhould be ever

(*a*) See the ſubſtance of the evidence on the petition preſented by the *Weſt-India* Planters and Merchants to the Houſe of Commons, as it was introduced at the BAR, and ſummed up by Mr. GLOVER.

(*b*) The annual average of the payments into the Exchequer, on account of the duties on tobacco, was for five years, from 1770 to 1774, 219,117 l. excluſive of the payments from *Scotland*.——Near one half of the *tobacco* trade is carried on from *Scotland*; and above *four fifths* of the tobacco imported is afterwards exported to *France*, *Germany* and other countries. From *France* alone it brings annually into the Kingdom, I am informed, about 150,000 l. in money.

In 1775, being, alas! the *parting* year, the duties on tobacco in ENGLAND brought into the *Exchequer* no leſs a ſum than 298,202 l.

(*c*) See the Appendix.

any reaſon for making ſuch a diſtinction. A government is, or ought to be, nothing but an inſtitution for collecting and for carrying into execution the will of the people. But ſo far is this from being in general the fact, that the meaſures of government, and the ſenſe of the people, are ſometimes in direct oppoſition to one another; nor does it *often* happen that any certain concluſion can be drawn from the one to the other.——I will not pretend to determine, whether, in the preſent inſtance, the diſhonour attending a retreat would belong to the nation at large, or only to the perſons in power who guide its affairs. Let it be granted, though probably far from true, that the majority of the kingdom favour the preſent meaſures. No good argument could be drawn from hence againſt receding. The diſgrace to which a kingdom muſt ſubmit by making conceſſions, is nothing to that of being the aggreſſors in an unrighteous quarrel; and dignity, in ſuch circumſtances, conſiſts in retracting freely, ſpeedily, and magnanimouſly. ——For, (to adopt, on this occaſion, words which I have heard applied to this very purpoſe, in a great aſſembly, by a peer to whom this kingdom has often looked as its deliverer, and whoſe ill ſtate of health at this awful moment of public danger every friend to *Britain* muſt deplore) to adopt, I ſay, the words of this great man — "RECTITUDE IS DIGNITY. OPPRESSION ONLY IS MEANNESS; "AND JUSTICE, HONOUR."

I will add, that PRUDENCE, no leſs than true HONOUR, requires us to retract. For the time may come when, if it is not done voluntarily, we may be *obliged* to do it; and find ourſelves under a neceſſity of granting that to our diſtreſſes, which we now deny to equity and humanity, and the prayers of *America*. The poſſibility of this appears plainly from the preceding pages; and ſhould it happen, it will bring upon us diſgrace indeed, diſgrace greater than the worſt rancour can wiſh to ſee accumulated on a kingdom already too much diſhonoured.——Let the reader think here what we are doing.—— A nation, once the protector of Liberty in diſtant countries, and the ſcourge of tyranny, changed into an enemy to Liberty, and engaged in endeavouring to reduce to ſervitude its own brethren.—— A great and enlightened nation, not content with a controuling power over millions of people which gave it every reaſonable advantage, inſiſting upon ſuch a ſupremacy over them as would leave them nothing they could call their own, and carrying deſolation and death among them for diſputing it.——What can be more ignominious?——How have we felt for the brave *Corſicans*, in their ſtruggle with the *Genoeſe*, and afterwards with the *French* government? Did GENOA or FRANCE want more than an abſolute command over their property and legiſlations; or the power of binding them in all caſes whatſoever?——The *Corſicans* had been ſubject to the *Genoeſe*; but, finding it difficult to keep them in ſubjection, they CEDED them to the *French*.——All ſuch ceſſions of one people by another are diſgraceful to human nature. But if our claims are juſt, may not we alſo, if we pleaſe, CEDE the Colonies to *France*?——There is, in truth, no other difference between theſe two caſes than that the *Corſicans* were not deſcended from the people who governed them, but that the *Americans* are.

There are ſome who ſeem to be ſenſible, that the authority of one country over another, cannot be diſtinguiſhed from the ſervitude of one country to another; and that unleſs different communities, as well as different parts of the ſame community, are united by an equal repreſentation, all ſuch authority is inconſiſtent with the principles of Civil Liberty. But they except the caſe of the Colonies and *Great Britain*; becauſe the Colonies are communities which have branched forth from, and which, therefore, as they think, belong to *Britain*. Had the Colonies been communities of *foreigners*, over whom we wanted to acquire dominion, or even to extend a dominion before acquired, they are ready to admit that their reſiſtance would have been juſt.—In my opinion, this is the ſame with ſaying, that the Colonies ought to be worſe off than the reſt of mankind, becauſe they are our own *Brethren*.

Again. The United Provinces of *Holland* were once ſubject to the *Spaniſh* monarchy; but, provoked by the violation of their charters; by levies of money, without their conſent; by the introduction of Spaniſh troops among them; by innovations in their antient modes of government; and the rejection of their petitions, they were driven to that reſiſtance which we and all the world have ever ſince admired; and which has given birth to one of the greateſt and happieſt Republics that ever exiſted.——Let any one read alſo, the hiſtory of the war which the *Athenians*, from a thirſt of Empire, made on the *Syracuſans* in *Sicily*, a people derived from the ſame origin with them; and let him, if he can, avoid rejoicing in the defeat of the *Athenians*.

Let him, likewiſe, read the account of the ſocial war among the Romans. The allied ſtates of *Italy* had fought the battles of *Rome*, and contributed by their valour and treaſure to its conqueſts and grandeur. They claimed, therefore, the rights of Roman citizens, and a ſhare with them in legiſlation. The Romans, diſdaining to make thoſe their *fellow-citizens*, whom they had always looked upon as their *ſubjects*, would not comply; and a war followed, the moſt horrible in the annals of mankind, which ended in the ruin of the Roman Republic. The feelings of every *Briton* in this caſe muſt force him to approve the conduct of the Allies, and to condemn the proud and ungrateful Romans.

But not only is the preſent conteſt with *America* thus diſgraceful to us, becauſe inconſiſtent with our own feelings in ſimilar caſes; but alſo becauſe condemned by our own practice in former times. The Colonies are perſuaded that they are fighting for Liberty. We ſee them ſacrificing to this perſuaſion every private advantage. If miſtaken, and though guilty of irregularities, they ſhould be pardoned by a people whoſe anceſtors have given them ſo many examples of ſimilar conduct. ENGLAND ſhould venerate the attachment of Liberty amidſt all its exceſſes; and, inſtead of indignation or ſcorn, it would be moſt becoming them, in the preſent inſtance, to declare their applauſe, and to ſay to the Colonies—— "We excuſe your miſtakes. We admire your ſpirit. It is the ſpirit that has "more than once ſaved *ourſelves*. We aſpire to no dominion over you. We "underſtand the rights of men too well to think of taking from you the ineſtim- "able privilege of governing yourſelves; and, inſtead of employing our power "for any ſuch purpoſe, we offer it to you as a friendly and guardian power, to "be a mediator in your quarrels; a protection againſt your enemies; and an "aid to you in eſtabliſhing a plan of Liberty that ſhall make you great and "happy. In return, we aſk nothing but your gratitude and your commerce."

This would be a language worthy of a brave and enlightened nation. But alas! it often happens in the *Political World* as it does in *Religion*, that the people who cry out moſt vehemently for Liberty to themſelves are the moſt unwilling to grant it to others.

One of the moſt violent enemies of the Colonies has pronounced them "all "Mr. Locke's diſciples."——Glorious title!—— How ſhameful is it to make war againſt them for that reaſon?

But farther. This war is diſgraceful on account of the perſuaſion which led to it, and under which it has been undertaken. The general cry was laſt winter, that the people of NEW ENGLAND were a body of cowards, who would at once be reduced to ſubmiſſion by a hoſtile look from our troops. In this light were they held up to public deriſion in both Houſes of Parliament; and it was this perſuaſion that, probably, induced a Nobleman of the firſt weight in the ſtate to recommend, at the paſſing of the *Boſton Port Bill*, coercive meaſures; hinting at the ſame time, that the *appearance* of hoſtilities would be ſufficient, and that all would be ſoon over, SINE CLADE.——Indeed no one can doubt, but that had it been believed ſome time ago, that the people of *America* were brave, more care would have been taken not to provoke them.

Again. The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted, renders it ſtill more diſgraceful.——Engliſh valour being thought inſufficient to ſub-

due the Colonies, the laws and religion of *France* were eſtabliſhed in *Canada*, on purpoſe to obtain the power of bringing upon them from thence an army of *French Papiſts*. The wild *Indians* and their own Slaves have been inſtigated to attack them; and attempts have been made to gain the aſſiſtance of a large body of *Ruſſians*.———With like views, *German* troops have been hired; and the defence of our Forts and Garriſons truſted in their hands.

Theſe are meaſures which need no comment. The laſt of them, in particular, having been carried into execution without the conſent of parliament, threatens us with imminent danger; and ſhews that we are in the way to loſe even the *Forms* of the conſtitution.———If, indeed, our miniſters can at any time, without leave, not only ſend away the national troops, but introduce *foreign* troops in their room, we lie entirely at mercy; and we have every thing to dread.

SECT. V. *Of the Probability of Succeeding in the War with* America.

LET us next conſider how far there is a poſſibility of ſucceeding in the preſent war.

Our own people, being unwilling to enliſt, and the attempts to procure armies of *Ruſſians*, *Indians*, and *Canadians* having miſcarried; the utmoſt force we can employ, including foreigners, does not exceed, if I am rightly informed, 30,000 effective men. Let it, however, be called 40,000. This is the force that is to conquer half a million *at leaſt* (*a*) of determined men fighting on their own ground, within ſight of their houſes and families, and for that ſacred bleſſing of Liberty, without which man is a beaſt, and government a curſe. All hiſtory proves, that in ſuch a ſituation, a handful is a match for millions.

In the *Netherlands*, a few ſtates thus circumſtanced, withſtood, for thirty years, the whole force of the Spaniſh monarchy, when at its zenith; and at laſt humbled its pride, and emancipated themſelves from its tyranny.——— The citizens of SYRACUSE alſo, thus circumſtanced, withſtood the whole power of the *Athenians*, and almoſt ruined them.—The ſame happened in the conteſt between the houſe of *Auſtria*, and the cantons (*b*) of *Switzerland*.———There is in this caſe an infinite difference between attacking and being attacked; between fighting to *deſtroy*, and fighting to *preſerve*, or *acquire* Liberty.———Were we, therefore, capable of employing a *land* force againſt *America* equal to its own, there would be little probability of ſucceſs. But to think of conquering that whole continent with 30,000 or 40,000 men to be tranſported acroſs the *Atlantic*, and fed from hence, and incapable of being recruited after any defeat.——This is indeed a folly ſo great, that language does not afford a name for it.

With reſpect to our naval force, could it fail at land as it does at ſea, much might be done with it; but as that is impoſſible, *little* or *nothing* can be done with it, which will not hurt *ourſelves* more than the *Coloniſts*.———Such of their maritime towns as they cannot guard againſt our fleets, and have not been already deſtroyed, they are determined either to give up to our reſentment, or (*c*) deſtroy themſelves: The conſequence of which will be, that theſe towns will be rebuilt in ſafer ſituations; and that we ſhall loſe ſome of the principal pledges by which we have hitherto held them in ſubjection.———As to their trade; having all the neceſſaries and the chief conveniencies of life within themſelves, they have no dependence upon it; and the loſs of it will do them unſpeakable good, by pre-

(*a*) A quarter of the inhabitants of every country are fighting men.——If, therefore, the Colonies conſiſt only of two millions of inhabitants, the number of fighting men in them will be half a million.

(*b*) See the Appendix to Dr. Zubly's Sermon, preached at the opening of the Provincial Congreſs of *Georgia*.

(*c*) NEW YORK has been long deſerted by the greateſt part of the inhabitants; and they are determined to burn it themſelves, rather than ſuffer us to burn it.

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ſerving them from the evils of luxury and the temptations of wealth; and keeping them in that ſtate of virtuous ſimplicity which is the greateſt happineſs. I know that I am now ſpeaking the ſenſe of ſome of the wiſeſt men in America. It has been long their wiſh that *Britain* would ſhut up all their ports. They will rejoice, particularly, in the laſt reſtraining act. It might have happened, that the people would have grown weary of their agreements not to export or import. But this act will oblige them to keep theſe agreements; and confirm their unanimity and zeal. It will alſo furniſh them with a reaſon for confiſcating the eſtates of all the friends of our government among them, and for employing their ſailors, who would have been otherwiſe idle, in making repriſals on Britiſh property. Their ſhips, before uſeleſs, and conſiſting of many hundreds, will be turned into ſhips of war; and all that attention, which they have hitherto confined to trade, will be employed in fitting out a naval force for their own defence; and thus the way will be prepared for their becoming, much ſooner than they would otherwiſe have been, a great maritime power. This act of parliament, therefore, crowns the folly of all our late meaſures.——None who know me, can believe me to be diſpoſed to ſuperſtition. Perhaps, however, I am not in the preſent inſtance, free from this weakneſs.——I fancy I ſee in theſe meaſures ſomething that cannot be accounted for merely by human ignorance. I am inclined to think, that the hand of Providence is in them working to bring about ſome great ends.—But this leads me to one conſideration more, which I cannot help offering to the publick, and which appears to me in the higheſt degree important.

In this hour of tremendous danger, it would become us to turn our thoughts to Heaven. This is what our brethren in the Colonies are doing. From one end of *North America* to the other, they are FASTING and PRAYING. But what are we doing?—Shocking thought! we are ridiculing them as *Fanatics*, and ſcoffing at religion.——We are running wild after pleaſure, and forgetting every thing ſerious and decent at *Maſquerades*—We are gambling in gaming houſes; trafficking for Boroughs; perjuring ourſelves at Elections; and ſelling ourſelves for places.—Which ſide then is Providence likely to favour?

In *America* we ſee a number of riſing ſtates in the vigour of youth, inſpired by the nobleſt of all paſſions, the paſſion for being free; and animated by piety. ——*Here* we ſee an old ſtate, great indeed, but inflated and irreligious; enervated by luxury; encumbered with debts; and hanging by a thread.——Can any one look without pain to the iſſue? May we not expect calamities that ſhall recover to *reflection* (perhaps to *devotion*) our *Libertines* and *Atheiſts?*

Is our cauſe ſuch as gives us reaſon to aſk God to bleſs it?——Can we in the face of Heaven declare, "that we are not the aggreſſors in this war; and that "we mean by it, not to acquire or even preſerve dominion for its own ſake; "not conqueſt, or Empire, or the gratification of reſentment; but ſolely to de-"liver ourſelves from oppreſſion; to gain reparation for injury; and to defend "ourſelves againſt men who would plunder or kill us?"—Remember, reader, whoever thou art, that there are no other juſt cauſes of war; and that blood ſpilled, with any other views, muſt ſome time or other be accounted for.—— But not to expoſe myſelf by ſaying more in this way, I will now beg leave to recapitulate ſome of the arguments I have uſed; and to deliver the feelings of my heart in a brief, but earneſt addreſs to my countrymen.

I am hearing it continually urged——"Are they not our ſubjects."——The plain anſwer is, they are not your ſubjects. The people of *America* are no more the ſubjects of the people of *Britain*, than the people of *Yorkſhire* are the ſubjects of the people of *Middleſex*. They are your *fellow-ſubjects*.

"But *we* are taxed; and why ſhould not *they* be taxed?"——*You* are taxed by yourſelves. They inſiſt on the ſame privilege.——They are taxed to ſupport their own governments; and they help alſo to pay your taxes by purchaſing

chaſing your manufactures, and giving you a monopoly of their trade. Muſt they maintain *two* governments? Muſt they ſubmit to be *triple* taxed?—Has your moderation in taxing yourſelves been ſuch as encourages them to truſt you with the power of taxing them?

" But they will not obey the *Parliament* and the *Laws*."——Say rather, they will not obey *your* Parliament and *your* laws. Their reaſon is: They have no voice in your Parliament. They have no ſhare in making (*a*) your laws.—— " Neither have *moſt* of us."———Then you ſo far want Liberty; and your language is, " *We* are not free; Why will *they* be free?"——But *many* of you have a voice in parliament; *None* of them have. *All* your freehold land is repreſented: But not a foot of *their* land is repreſented. At worſt, therefore, you can be only enſlaved *partially*.—They would be enſlaved *totally*.—They are governed by parliaments choſen by themſelves, and by legiſlatures ſimilar to yours. Why will you diſturb them in the enjoyment of a bleſſing ſo invaluable? Is it reaſonable to inſiſt, that your diſcretion alone ſhall be their law; that they ſhall have no conſtitutions of government, except ſuch as you ſhall be pleaſed to give them; and no property except ſuch as your parliament ſhall be pleaſed to leave them?—What is your parliament?—Powerful indeed and reſpectable: But is there not a growing intercourſe between it and the court? Does it awe miniſters of ſtate as it once did?—Inſtead of contending for a controuling power over the governments of *America*, ſhould you not think more of watching and reforming your own?—Suppoſe the worſt. Suppoſe, in oppoſition to all their own declarations, that the Coloniſts are now aiming at independence.—" If " they can ſubſiſt without you;" is it to be wondered at? Did there ever exiſt a *community*, or even an *individual*, that would not do the ſame?—" If they *cannot* " ſubſiſt without you;" let them alone. They will ſoon come back. ——" If " you cannot ſubſiſt without them;" reclaim them by (*b*) kindneſs; engage them by moderation and equity. It is madneſs to reſolve to butcher them. This will make them deteſt and avoid you for ever. Free men are not to be governed by force; or dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to be ſo treated, it is a diſgrace to be connected with them.

" If *they* can ſubſiſt without you; and alſo *you* without them," the attempt to ſubjugate them by confiſcating their effects, burning their towns, and ravaging their territories, is a wanton exertion of cruel ambition, which, however common it has been among mankind, deſerves to be called by harder names than I chuſe to apply to it.—Suppoſe ſuch an attempt was to be ſucceeded: Would it not be a fatal preparation for ſubduing yourſelves? Would not the diſpoſal of *American* places, and the diſtribution of an *American* revenue, render that influence of the crown irreſiſtible, which has already ſtabbed your liberties?

(*a*) " I have no other notion of ſlavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not conſent." See the caſe of *Ireland*'s being bound by acts of Parliament in *England*, ſtated by William Molyneux, Eſq; Dublin.——In arguing againſt the authority of Communities, and all people not incorporated, over one another; I have confined my views to taxation and internal legiſlation. Mr. Molyneux carried his views much farther; and denied the right of *England* to make any laws even to regulate the trade of *Ireland*. He was the intimate friend of Mr. Locke; and writ his book in 1698, ſoon after the publication of Mr. Locke's Treatiſe on Government.

What I have ſaid, in Part 1ſt. Sect. 3d. of ſubjecting a number of ſtates to a general council repreſenting them all, I ſuppoſe every one muſt conſider as entirely theoretical; and not a propoſal of any thing I wiſh, may take place under the Britiſh Empire.

(*b*) Some perſons, convinced of the *folly* as well as *barbarity* of attempting to keep the Colonies by ſlaughtering them, have very humanely propoſed giving them up. But the higheſt authority has informed us, with great reaſon, " That they are too important to be given up."——Dr. TUCKER has inſiſted on the depopulation, produced by migrations from this country to the Colonies, as a reaſon for this meaſure. But, unleſs the kingdom is made a priſon to its inhabitants, theſe migrations cannot be prevented; nor do I think that they have any great tendency to produce depopulation. When a number of people quit a country, there is more employment and greater plenty of the means of ſubſiſtence left for thoſe who remain; and the vacancy is ſoon filled up. The grand cauſes of depopulation are, not migrations, or even famines and plagues, or any other *temporary* evils; but the permanent and ſlowly-working evils of debauchery, luxury, high taxes, and oppreſſion.

Turn

Turn your eyes to *India:* There more has been done than is now attempted in *America.* There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the ſpirit of conqueſt, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions of innocent people by the moſt infamous oppreſſion and rapacity.—The juſtice of the nation has ſlept over theſe enormities. Will the juſtice of Heaven ſleep?——Are we not now execrated on both ſides of the globe?

With reſpect to the Coloniſts; it would be folly to pretend they are faultleſs. They were running faſt into our vices. But this quarrel gives them a ſalutary check: And it may be permitted on purpoſe to favour them, and in them the reſt of mankind; by making way for eſtabliſhing, in an extenſive country poſſeſſed of every advantage, a plan of government, and a growing power that ſhall aſtoniſh the world, and under which every ſubject of human enquiry ſhall be open to free diſcuſſion, and the friends of Liberty, in every quarter of the globe, find a ſafe retreat from civil and ſpiritual tyranny.——— I hope, therefore, our brethren in *America* will forgive their enemies. It is certain that *they know not what they are doing.*

CONCLUSION.

HAVING ſaid ſo much of the war with America, and particularly of the danger with which it threatens us, it may be expected that I ſhould propoſe ſome method of eſcaping from this danger, and of reſtoring this once happy Empire to a ſtate of peace and ſecurity.—Various plans of pacification have been propoſed; and ſome of them, by perſons ſo diſtinguiſhed by their rank and merit, as to be above my applauſe. But till there is more of a diſpoſition to attend to ſuch plans; they cannot, I am afraid, be of any great ſervice. And there is too much reaſon to apprehend, that nothing but calamity will bring us to repentance and wiſdom. ——— In order, however, to complete my deſign in theſe obſervations, I will take the liberty to lay before the public the following ſketch of one of the plans juſt referred to, as it was opened before the holidays to the houſe of Lords by the *Earl of Shelburne*; who, while he held the ſeals of the Southern Department, with the buſineſs of the Colonies annexed, poſſeſſed their confidence, without ever compromiſing the authority of this country; a confidence which diſcovered itſelf by peace among themſelves, and duty and ſubmiſſion to the Mother-country. I hope I ſhall not take an unwarrantable liberty, if, on this occaſion, I uſe his Lordſhip's own words, as nearly as I have been able to collect them.

" Meet the Colonies on their own ground, in the laſt petition from the " Congreſs to the king. The ſureſt, as well as the moſt dignified mode of " proceeding for this country.—Suſpend all hoſtilities—Repeal the acts which " immediately diſtreſs America, namely, the laſt reſtraining act,—the charter " act,—the act for the more impartial adminiſtration of juſtice;—and the Quebec " act.—All the other acts (the cuſtom houſe act, the poſt office act, &c.) leave " to a temperate reviſal.——There will be found much matter which both " countries may wiſh repealed. *Some* which can never be given up, the prin- " ciple being that regulation of trade for the common good of the Empire, which " forms our *Palladium. Other* matter which is fair ſubject of mutual accommo- " dation. ——— Preſcribe the moſt explicit acknowledgement of your right of re- " gulating commerce in its moſt extenſive ſenſe; if the petition and other " public acts of the Colonies have not already, by their declarations and ac- " knowledgements, left it upon a ſufficiently ſecure foundation.—Beſides the " power of regulating the general commerce of the Empire, ſomething further " might be expected; provided a due and tender regard were had to the means

" and abilities of the ſeveral provinces, as well as to thoſe fundamental, unalien-
" able rights of *Engliſhmen*, which no father can ſurrender on the part of his
" ſon, no repreſentative on the part of his elector, no generation on the part of
" the ſucceeding one; the right of judging not only of the *mode* of raiſing, but
" the *quantum*, and the appropriation of ſuch aids as they ſhall grant.—To be
" more explicit; the debt of *England*, without entering into invidious diſtinc-
" tions how it came to be contracted, might be acknowledged the debt of every
" individual part of the whole Empire, Aſia, as well as America, included.——
" Provided, that full ſecurity were held forth to them, that ſuch free aids, to-
" gether with the Sinking Fund (Great Britain contributing her ſuperior ſhare)
" ſhould not be left as the privy purſe of the miniſter, but be unalienably appro-
" priated to the original intention of that fund, the diſcharge of the debt;—
" and that by an honeſt application of the *whole* fund, the taxes might in time be
" leſſened, and the price of our manufactures conſequently reduced, ſo that every
" contributory part might feel the returning benefit—always ſuppoſing the laws
" of trade duly obſerved and enforced.

" The time *was*, I am confident—and perhaps *is*, when theſe points might be
" obtained upon the eaſy, the conſtitutional, and, therefore, the indiſpenſible
" terms of an exemption from parliamentary taxation, and an admiſſion of the
" ſacredneſs of their charters; inſtead of ſacrificing their good humour, their
" affection, their effectual aids, and the act of NAVIGATION itſelf, (which you
" are now in the direct road to do) for a commercial quit-rent, (*a*) or a barren
" metaphyſical chimæra.——How long theſe ends may continue attainable, no
" man can tell.——But if no words are to be relied on except ſuch as make
" againſt the Colonies—If nothing is acceptable, except what is attainable by
" force; it only remains to apply, what has been ſo often remarked of unhappy
" periods,——*Quos Deus vult, &c.*"

Theſe are ſentiments and propoſals of the laſt importance; and I am very happy in being able to give them to the public from ſo reſpectable an authority, as that of the diſtinguiſhed Peer I have mentioned; to whom, I know, this kingdom, as well as America, is much indebted for his zeal to promote thoſe grand public points on which the preſervation of Liberty among us depends; and for the firm oppoſition which, jointly with many others (Noblemen and Commoners of the firſt character and abilities,) he has made to the preſent meaſures.

Had ſuch a plan as that now propoſed been adopted a few months ago, I have little doubt but that a pacification would have taken place, on terms highly advantageous to this kingdom.——In particular. It is probable, that the Colonies would have conſented to grant an annual ſupply, which, increaſed by a ſaving of the money now ſpent in maintaining troops among them, and by contributions which might have been gained from other parts of the Empire, would have formed a fund conſiderable enough, if unalienably applied (*b*), to redeem the public debt; in conſequence of which, agreeably to Lord Shelburne's ideas, ſome of our worſt taxes might be taken off, and the Colonies would receive our manufactures cheaper; our paper-currency might be reſtrained; our whole force would be free to meet at any time foreign danger; the influence of the Crown would be reduced; our Parliament would become more independent; and the kingdom might, perhaps, be reſtored to a ſituation of permanent ſafety and proſperity.

(*a*) See the Reſolutions on the *Nova-Scotia* petition reported to the Houſe of Commons, November 29, 1775, by Lord North, Lord George Germaine, &c. and a bill ordered to be brought in upon the ſaid Reſolutions.——There is indeed, as Lord Shelburne has hinted, ſomething very aſtoniſhing in theſe Reſolutions. They offer a relaxation of the authority of this country, in points to which the Colonies have always conſented, and by which we are great gainers; at the ſame time, that, with a rigour which hazards the Empire, we are maintaining its authority in points to which they will never conſent; and by which nothing can be gained.

(*b*) See the Appendix.

To conclude.——An important revolution in the affairs of this kingdom ſeems to be approaching. If ruin is not to be our lot, all that has been lately done muſt be undone, and new meaſures adopted. At that period, an opportunity (never perhaps to be recovered, if loſt) will offer itſelf for ſerving eſſentially *this country*, as well as *America*; by putting the national debt into *a fixed* courſe of payment; by ſubjecting to new regulations, the adminiſtration of the finances; and eſtabliſhing meaſures for exterminating corruption and reſtoring the conſtitution. ———For my own part; if this is not to be the conſequence of any future changes in the miniſtry, and the ſyſtem of corruption, lately ſo much improved, is to go on; I think it totally indifferent to the kingdom who are *in*, or who are *out* of power.

APPENDIX.

Amount of the NATIONAL DEBT, *and* APPROPRIATED REVENUE, *at Midſummer* 1775.

	Principal.	Intereſt.
The amount of the capitals at the Bank, South Sea, and India Houſes was (in January 1775) 125,056,454 l. See the particulars in an account by *R. Helm*, at the *Stock Exchange*, corrected for January 5th, 1775.		
Deduct 2 millions Capital of India Annuit.; deduct alſo 424,500 l. Conſol. Annuit. 246,300 l. Reduced; 161,650 l. Old S. S. Annuit. 124,200 l. New S. S. Annuit. and 43,350 l. Annuit. 1751, making in all a million of the 3 *per cents*, paid off in 1775; and the remainder will be — — — —	£. 122.056,454	£. 3.874,057
Deduct farther, from the annual intereſt in Mr. *Helm*'s account, (beſides the *Long Annuity*, and the intereſt of three millions at 3 *per cent.*) 383,814 l. being the amount of the exceſſes of the *Dividends* (*a*) paid by the three companies above the intereſt they receive from government:		
Undivided Capital of the *Bank*, making up the whole to 11,686,800 l. — — — — —	906,800	27,204
Annuities for 99, 96, and 89 years, from various dates in King William's and Queen Ann's time. Suppoſing 18 years to come of theſe Annuities, their value will be (reckoning intereſt at $3\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.*) $13\frac{1}{5}$ years purchaſe, or nearly — —	1.801,179	136,453
Annuities for lives, with benefit of ſurvivorſhip, in King William's time, ſuppoſed worth Four years purchaſe.——N. B. The benefit of ſurvivorſhip is to be continued till the Annuitants are reduced to Seven — — — — —	30,268	7,567
Annuities on lives, with benefit of Survivorſhip, granted Anno 1765—valued at 20 years purchaſe — —	10,800	540
Carried over —— —— ——	124.805,501	4.045,821

(*a*) This deduction was not made in the former editions of this work. I ſhould have thanked the writer who has pointed out this omiſſion to me, had he done it in a handſomer manner. But nothing depends on this omiſſion; nor does it affect the concluſion with a view to which I have choſen to ſtate the national debt.

Annuities

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over —	124.805,501	4.045,821
Annuities for two or three lives granted in 1693. Alſo annuities on ſingle lives 1745, 1746, 1757. The original amount of theſe annuities, taken all together, was 123,883 l. They are now reduced by deaths to about 80,000 l. I have valued them at 10 years purchaſe — — —	800,000	80,000
Long annuity for 99 years 1761——The value of this annuity is in the *Alley* about 25½ years purchaſe; but the remaining term is really worth 27 years purchaſe — — —	6.702,750	248,250
UNFUNDED DEBT, conſiſting of Exchequer Bills (1,250,000 l.) Navy debt (1,850,000 l.) and Civil Liſt debt, ſuppoſed 500,000 l. The intereſt is reckoned at no more than 2½ *per cent.* — —	3.600,000	90,000
Total of the National debt in 1775 ——	135.908,251	4.464,071
Add (*a*) — — —		200,000
Civil Liſt — — —		800,000
Total of the appropriated Revenue — — — —		5.494,071

I have given the *Navy Debt* as it was about a year ago. It muſt be now greatly increaſed. —— The *Civil Liſt Debt* has been given by gueſs. It is generally reckoned not to be more than the ſum I have ſpecified; and it is alſo expected that the Civil Liſt income will be raiſed to 900,000 l. or 1.000,000 *per ann.* —— In 1769 the ſum of 513,511 l. was granted by parliament towards diſcharging the arrears and debts then due on the Civil Liſt.

By an act of the firſt of George II. the income of the Civil Liſt was to be made up to 800,000 l. whenever, in any year, the duties and revenues appropriated to it fell ſhort of that ſum. The clear produce of theſe duties for 33 years, or from Midſummer 1727, to Midſummer 1760, was, according to a particular account in my poſſeſſion, 26.182,981 l. 17 s. 6 d. or 793,423 l. *per ann.* They fell ſhort, therefore, taking one year with another, *more* than they exceeded.——In 1747, they had been deficient for ſeven years together; and the whole deficiency amounted to 456,733 l. 16 s.—which, in conformity to the act I have mentioned, was made good to his majeſty out of the ſupplies for that year.——In 1729 alſo, 115,000 l. was granted out of the ſupplies for the like reaſon.—This is all the money, received by his late majeſty from parliament, towards ſupporting his houſhold and the dignity of his civil government; or 810,749 l. *per ann.*—I have thought proper to ſtate this matter ſo particularly here; becauſe accounts groſsly wrong have been given of it.

The amount of the National Debt, it has appeared, was laſt year 136 millions —The great deficiencies of laſt year, added to the extraordinary expences of the preſent year, will increaſe this debt conſiderably.——Drawing out, embody-

(*a*) Being charges of management at the Bank, South-Sea Houſe and India Houſes; Fees, Salaries and other Expences at the Exchequer; Intereſt of loans on the Sinking Fund; Annuities payable to the Dukes of Glouceſter and Cumberland, and the Repreſentatives of Arthur Onſlow, Eſq; Sheriffs of England; expence of coinage; firſt fruits of the clergy, &c. — Theſe Articles were omitted in the former Editions, and ſerved to balance the overcharges of intereſt on the *Bank* and *India* capitals. I have probably under-rated them; but it cannot be expected that I ſhould be able to give their exact amount. I leave, therefore, this part of the appropriated revenue to be corrected by thoſe who are better informed.

ing,

ing, and maintaining the militia in the laſt war, coſt the nation near half a million *per ann.*—We cannot reckon upon a leſs expence in doing this now. Add to it, pay for foreign troops, and all the extraordinary expences of our increaſed Navy and Army, tranſport ſervice, recruiting ſervice, ordnance, &c. and it will be evident that the whole expence of this unhappy year muſt be enormous.—But I expect that care will be taken to hide it, by funding as little as poſſible, and that for this reaſon it will not be known in its full magnitude, till it comes to appear another year under the articles of Navy debt, extraordinaries of the army, tranſport bills, ordnance debentures, &c. making up a vaſt unfunded debt which may bear down all public credit.

State of the SURPLUS *of the* REVENUE *for* 11 *years ended at* 1775.

UNAPPROPRIATED REVENUE.

	£.
NETT PRODUCE of the Sinking Fund for the laſt five years, including caſual ſurpluſſes, reckoning to *Chriſtmas* in every year; being the annual medium, after deducing from it about 45,000l. always carried to it from the ſupplies, in order to replace ſo much taken from it every year to make good a deficiency in a Fund eſtabliſhed in 1758 — ———	2.610,759
Nett annual produce of Land Tax at 3s. militia deducted; and of the Malt Tax ——— ——— ———	1.800,000
(N. B. Theſe two taxes in 1773, brought in only 1.665,475 l.	
There are ſome caſual Receipts, not included in the Sinking Fund, ſuch as duties on Gum Senega, American Revenue, &c. But they are ſo uncertain and inconſiderable, that it is ſcarcely proper to give them as a part of the permanent Revenue. Add however on this account ——— ——— ———	50,000
Total of unappropriated (*a*) Revenue	£. 4.460,759

Produce of the SINKING FUND, *reckoned to* Chriſtmas *in every Year.*

	£.
1770 ——	2.486,836
1771 ——	2.553,505
1772 ——	2.683,831
1773 ——	2.823,150
1774 ——	2.731,476

In 1775 the ſinking Fund was taken for 2.900,000 l. including an extraordinary charge of 100,000 l. on the *Aggregate* Fund. If it has not produced ſo much,

(*a*) The greateſt part of this Revenue is borrowed of the Bank, and ſpent before it comes into the Exchequer. And therefore, is a debt conſtantly due to the Bank, for which intereſt is paid. ——One of my anſwerers has denied this aſſertion; but at the ſame time has confirmed it, by ſaying that only 2.250,000 l. was borrowed in 1775 on the unappropriated Revenue.—The ſame writer has aſſerted, that there are THREE MILLIONS of *India* Annuities created by the company itſelf, and that this makes TWO MILLIONS difference in the amount of the national debt.—The truth is, that in conſequence of taking Mr. *Helm*'s paper (a paper perfectly adapted to the purpoſe for which it is intended) without examining it; I had made the capital of the perpetual Annuities to be 124.056,454 l.; whereas, if two millions *India* Annuities are rejected, and 906,800l. undivided capital of the *Bank* admitted, it comes out to be 122.963,254 l. See p. 41. —— The writer who has given to the public this information, received it, I underſtand, from the great miniſter who directs our Finances, to whoſe Authority on this ſubject I am very ready to ſubmit. Pity it is, that he did not chooſe to communicate it by a perſon poſſeſs'd of more of his own ability and candour.

the

the deficiency is a debt contracted laſt year, which muſt be added to other debts (referred to in Page 43) ariſing from deficiencies in the proviſion made for the expences of laſt year. This proviſion amounted to 3.703,476 l.; but it has fallen ſhort above a million and a half. (*a*)

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

	£.
Peace Eſtabliſhment, for the Navy and Army, including all miſcellaneous and incidental expences —— ——	3.700,000
Annual Increaſe of the Navy and Civil Liſt Debts ——	350,000
Intereſt at 2½ of 3,600,000 l. unfunded debt, which muſt be paid out of the unappropriated Revenue — ——	90,000
Total	4.140,000
Annual Surplus of the Revenue	320,759
Annual income	£. 4.460,759

The eſtimate for the peace eſtabliſhment, including miſcellaneous expences, amounted, I have ſaid, in 1775 to 3.703,476 l.—In 1774 it amounted to 3.804,452 l. excluſive of 250,000 l. raiſed by Exchequer Bills, towards defraying the expence of calling in the gold coin. And the medium for eleven years, from 1765, has been nearly 3.700,000 l.—According to the accounts which I have collected, the expence of the peace eſtabliſhment (including miſcellaneous expences) was in 1765, 1766, and 1767, 3.540,000 l. *per ann.*—In 1768, 1769, and 1770, it was 3.354,000 l. *per ann.* — In 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775, the average has been nearly four millions *per ann.* excluſive of the expence of calling in the coin.

The parliament votes for the ſea ſervice 4 l. *per* month *per* man, including wages, wear and tear, victuals and ordnance. This allowance is inſufficient, and falls ſhort every year more or leſs, in proportion to the number of men voted. From hence, in a great meaſure, ariſes that annual increaſe of the navy debt, mentioned in the ſecond article of the *National Expenditure*. This increaſe in 1772 and 1773 was 669,996 l. or 335,000 l. *per ann.* The number of men voted in thoſe two years, was 20,000. I have ſuppoſed them reduced to 16,000, and the annual increaſe of the Navy Debt to be only 250,000 l.——Add 100,000 l. for the annual increaſe of the Civil Liſt Debt (ſee p. 42.) and the total will be 350,000 l.

There is another method of proving that the permanent ſurplus of the revenue cannot exceed the ſum now ſtated.

I have learnt from the higheſt authority, that the national debt, about a year ago, had been diminiſhed near 9 millions and a half, (*b*) ſince the peace in 1763; including a million of the 3 *per cents* diſcharged laſt year.——The money employed in making this reduction, muſt have been derived from the ſurplus of the *ordinary* and ſtated revenue, added to the *extraordinary* receipts. Theſe *extraordinary* receipts have conſiſted of the following articles.——1. The Land Tax at 4 s. in the pound in 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1771; or 1 s. in the pound *extraordinary* for four years, making 1.750,000 l.——2. The profits of Ten Lotteries, making (at 150,000 l. each Lottery) 1.500,000 l.——3. A contribution of 400,000 l. *per ann.* from the *India* company for five years, making 2.000,000 l. —— 4. 110,000 l.

(*a*) The expences of the army not provided for in 1775 have amounted to 845,000 l. ſpent chiefly at *Boſton*. —— The Navy debt increaſed, during the courſe of the ſame year, from 1.850,000 l. to 2.698,579 l.

(*b*) This was Lord *North*'s account at opening the budget in 1775. The particulars, as I have been able to collect them, I have ſtated in the Poſtſcript.

paid

paid by the Bank in 1764 for the privilege of exclusive banking. Also the money paid by *France* for maintaining their prisoners; and the money arising from the sale of *French* prizes, taken before the declaration of war; from savings on particular grants at the end of the war, &c. &c.—which (*a*) I will take at no more than 300,000 l. Add 3.600,000 l. arising from a surplus of 300,000 l. for twelve years; and the total will be 9.260,000 l. which is a sum more than sufficient to discharge 9 millions and a half of the public debt.

Sketch of an Account of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes.

	£.
CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the medium of the payments into the Exchequer, for 3 years ending in 1773 (*b*) — —	2.528,275
Amount of the EXCISES in ENGLAND, including the malt tax, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 — —	4.649,892
Land Tax at 3 s. — — —	1.300,000
Land Tax at 1 s. in the pound — —	450,000
SALT DUTIES, being the medium of the years 1765 and 1766 —	218,739
Duties on Stamps, Cards, Dice, Advertisements, Bonds, Leases, Indentures, News-papers, Almanacks, &c. — —	280,788
Duties on houses and windows, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1771 — — —	385,369
Post-Office, Seizures, Wine Licences, Hackney Coaches, (*c*) Tenths of the Clergy, &c. — — —	250,000
EXCISES in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 — — — —	95,229
CUSTOMS in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 — — —	68,369
Annual profit from Lotteries — —	150,000
Inland taxes in SCOTLAND, deduction of 6 d. in the pound on all Pensions, Salaries, &c. casual revenues, such as the duties on Gum-Senega, American revenue, &c. — —	150,000
EXPENCE of collecting the EXCISES in ENGLAND, being the average of the years 1767 and 1768, when their produce was 4.531,075 l. *per ann.* 6 *per cent.* of the gross produce — —	297,887
EXPENCE of collecting the Excises in SCOTLAND, being the medium of the years 1772 and 1773, and the difference between the gross and nett produce—31 *per cent.* of the gross produce --	43,254
EXPENCE of collecting the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the average of 1771 and 1772; bounties included — 15 *per cent.* of the gross produce, exclusive of drawbacks and over-entries —	468,703

N. B. The bounties for 1771 were 202,840 l. for 1772, 172,468 l.
The charges of management for 1771, were 276,434 l.
For 1772, 285,764 l. or 10 *per cent.* nearly.

(*a*) My reason for this will be seen in the Postscript, page 48.

(*b*) The annual medium of the payments into the Exchequer from the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, for the last five years, has been 2.521,769 l.—In 1774 this payment was 2.547,717 l. In 1775, it was 2.476,302 l.—The produce of the CUSTOMS, therefore, has been given rather too high.

The produce of the EXCISES in England has been higher in 1772 and 1775 than in any other two years; but the average of any three successive years, or of all the five years since 1770, will not differ much from the sum I have given.—In 1754, or the year before the last war, the CUSTOMS produced only 1.558,254 l.—The Excises produced 2.819,702 l.—And the whole revenue, exclusive of the Malt-tax and Land-tax at 2 s. was 5.097,617 l.

(*c*) These branches of the revenue produced in 1754 210,243 l. I do not know how much they have produced lately; but I believe I have estimated them at the highest.—In 1754 the Revenue of the Post-Office was 100,710 l. It brought in last year 125,000 l.

Interest

Intereſt of loans on the land tax at 4 l. expences of collection, militia, &c.	250,000
PERQUISITES, &c. to Cuſtom-houſe officers, &c. ſuppoſed	250,000
EXPENCE of collecting the Salt Duties in ENGLAND, 10½ *per cent.*	27,000
Bounties on fiſh exported	18,000
EXPENCE of collecting the duties on Stamps, Cards, Advertiſements, &c. 5¼ *per cent.*	18,000
Total	£. 11,900,505

It muſt be ſeen, that this account is imperfect. It is, however, ſufficient to prove, that the whole money raiſed DIRECTLY by the taxes, cannot be much leſs than TWELVE MILLIONS. But as the increaſed price of one commodity has a tendency to raiſe the price of other commodities; and as alſo dealers generally add more than the value of a tax to the price of a commodity, beſides charging intereſt for the money they advance on the taxes; for theſe reaſons, it ſeems certain, that the taxes have an INDIRECT effect of great conſequence; and that a larger ſum is drawn by them from the public, than their *groſs* produce.——It is farther to be conſidered, that many of the perſons who are now ſupported by collecting the taxes, would have ſupported themſelves by commerce or agriculture; and therefore, inſtead of taking away from the public ſtock, would have been employed in increaſing it.——Some have reckoned, that on all theſe accounts the expence of the taxes is *doubled*; but this muſt be extravagant. Let us ſuppoſe a *fourth* only added; and it will follow, that the money drawn from the public by the taxes (excluſive of tythes, county-rates, and the taxes which maintain the poor) is near 15 millions *per ann.*; a ſum equal to the whole ſpecie of the kingdom; which, therefore, had we no paper currency, would be totally inadequate to the wants of the kingdom.

Without all doubt ſuch a ſtate of things, in a great commercial nation, is moſt dangerous, and frightful; but it admits of no remedy, while the public debt continues what it is.——With a view, therefore, to the quick reduction of this debt, I will throw away, after all I have ſaid on this ſubject on former occaſions, the following propoſals.——It has appeared, that, ſuppoſing the taxes not to become leſs productive, and the current national expence to continue the ſame that it had been for ten years before 1775, a ſurplus may be expected in the revenue of about 300,000 l. *per ann.*—With a ſurplus ſo trifling, nothing can be done; but it might be increaſed, firſt of all; By keeping the LAND TAX for the future at 4 s. in the pound.—As rents have been almoſt doubled, this will not be much more to the preſent proprietors of land, than 2 s. in the pound was formerly. 'Tis, therefore, equitable; and it will add to the national income near 450,000 l.

Secondly, All the money now ſpent in maintaining troops in America might be ſaved.——The Colonies are able to defend themſelves. They wiſh to be allowed to do it. Should they ever want the aid of our troops, they will certainly pay us for them. Indeed I am of opinion, they will never be willing to make peace with us, without ſtipulating that we ſhall withdraw our troops from them. Were there any external power that claimed and exerciſed a right of ſtationing troops in this country, without our conſent, we ſhould certainly think ourſelves entirely undone.——I will eſtimate this ſaving at no more than 200,000 l. *per ann.*

Thirdly, I do not ſee why the peace eſtabliſhment might not be reduced to what it was, at an average, in 1768, 1769 and 1770. This would produce a ſaving of 350,000 *l. per ann.*——I might here propoſe reducing the peace eſtabliſhment for the *Navy* to what it always was before the laſt war, or from 16,000 to 10,000 men. But it would be infinitely better to reduce the ARMY; and this might produce a farther ſaving of great conſequence.——But waving this, I ſhall only mention,

Fourthly,

Fourthly, That contributions might be obtained from *North-America* and other parts of the Britiſh Empire, on the principles ſtated from the EARL of SHELBURNE's authority, in page 39.—I will eſtimate theſe at no more than 400,000 l. *per ann.*——(*a*) Add the *Surplus* now in our poſſeſſion; and the total will be 1.700,000.——In the *Introduction* to the third edition of the Treatiſe on *Reverſionary Payments*, I have explained a method of paying off, with a ſinking Fund of a million *per ann.* (*b*), a hundred millions of the national debt in forty years. What then might not be done with ſuch a Fund as this?

In five years 18.986,300 l. will fall from an intereſt of 4 *per cent.* to 3 *per cent.*——Alſo, 4.500,000 l. 3½ *per cent.* 1758, will fall, in ſix years, to an intereſt of 3 *per cent.*—The long Annuities granted in King WILLIAM's time, will, in 20 years become extinct; as will alſo the greateſt part of the Life Annuities ſpecified in page 41.—All theſe ſavings will not amount to much leſs than 400,000 l. *per ann.* And were they to be added to the fund as they fall in, its operations would be ſo much accelerated, that in a few years we ſhould ſee this country above all its difficulties.——Still more might be done by ſtriking off unneceſſary places and penſions; by giving up all the means of corruption; by reducing the pay of the great officers of ſtate; and ſimplifying the taxes.——A miniſter who appeared determined to carry into execution ſuch a ſyſtem, would ſoon gain the confidence of the public; endear himſelf to all honeſt men; and in time come to be bleſſed as the Saviour of his country.——But what am I doing?——We have no ſuch happy period before us.——Our miniſters are active in purſuing meaſures which muſt increaſe our burthens. A horrid civil war is begun; and it may ſoon leave us nothing to be anxious about.

(*a*) We drew, ſome years ago, this contribution from ASIA only: and it cannot be unreaſonable to expect, that the greateſt part of it may be again drawn from thence after the expiration, in 1780, of the charter of the EAST-INDIA company. At that period alſo, it is much to be wiſhed that ſome effectual meaſures may be eſtabliſhed for making amends to the inhabitants of BENGAL for the ſhocking injuries they have ſuffered; and for ſkreening them from all farther injuries; and, likewiſe, for withdrawing from the crown that Patronage of the Eaſt India Company, which it has lately acquired, and which has given one of the deepeſt wounds to the conſtitution.

(*b*) At the time of writing the introduction here referred to, above three years ago, I *thought*, or rather *hoped*, that the ſurplus of the revenue might be taken at 900,000 l. *per ann.* But it muſt be conſidered, that the nation was then in poſſeſſion of a contribution of 400,000 l. *per ann.* from the India Company, which has been ſince loſt——See the Additional Preface to the 2d Edition *of the Appeal to the Public on the Subject of the National Debt.*

POSTSCRIPT.

ACCOUNT of Public debts diſcharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Intereſt ſaved, from 1763 to 1775.

Debts paid off ſince 1763.								Annuity decreaſed.	
		£.						£.	s.
1765	—	870,888	funded, bearing	intereſt	at	4 *per cent.*	——	34,835	10
		1.500,006	unfunded,	—	—	4 *per cent.*	——	60,000	00
1766	—	0.870,888	funded,	—	—	4 *per cent.*	——	34 835	10
		1.200,000	unfunded,	—	—	4 —	——	48,000	00
1767	—	2.616,777	funded,	—	—	4 —	——	104,671	0
1768	—	2.625,000	funded,	—	—	4 —	——	105,000	0
1771	—	1.500,000	funded,	—	—	3½ *per cent.*	——	52,500	0
1772	—	1.500,000	funded,	—	—	3 *per cent.*	——	45,000	0
1773	—	800,000	unfunded,	—	—	3 —	——	24.000	0
1774	—	1.000,000	funded,	—	—	3 —	——	30,000	0
1775	—	1.000,000	funded,	—	—	3 —	——	30,000	0
Total		15.483,553					Total —	568,842	0

In

In 1764, there was paid off 650,000 *l.* navy-debt; but this I have not charged, becauſe ſcarcely equal to that annual increaſe of the navy-debt for 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace eſtabliſhment. The ſame is true of 300,000 *l.* navy-debt, paid in 1767; of 400,000 *l.* paid in 1769; of 100,200 *l.* paid in 1770; 200,000 *l.* in 1771; 215,883 *l.* in 1772; and 200,000 *l.* in 1774.

Account of money borrowed ſince 1763.

		£.	Annual intereſt increaſed.
Borrowed and funded, at 3 *per cent.*	in 1765	1.500,000	45,000
	in 1766	1.500,000	45,000
	in 1767	1.500,000	45,000
	in 1768	1.900,000	57,000
Unfunded in 1774		250,000	7,500
	Total	6.650,000	199,500

From 15.483,553 *l.* the total of debts diſcharged, ſubtract 6.650,000 *l.* the total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.833,553 *l.* will be the diminution of the public debts ſince 1763. Alſo, from 568,842 *l.* the total of the decreaſe of the annual intereſt, ſubtract 199,500 *l.* (the total of its increaſe), and the remainder, or 369,342 *l.* will be the intereſt or annuity ſaved ſince 1763.—To this muſt be added 12,537 *l. per ann.* ſaved by changing a capital of 1.253,700 *l.* (part of 20 240,000 *l.*) from an intereſt of 4 to 3 *per cent.* purſuant to an act of the 10th of George III.; alſo the life-annuities that have fallen in; which will make a ſaving in the whole of near 400,000 *l. per annum:* And it is to this ſaving, together with the increaſe of luxury, that the increaſe of the *Sinking Fund* for the laſt ten years has been owing.

To the debts diſcharged the following additions muſt be made.

In 1764 there was paid towards diſcharging the extraordinary expences of the army, 987,434 *l.*: In 1765, theſe expences amounted to 404,496 *l.*: In 1766, to 404,310 *l.*—Total 1 796,240 *l.*—This ſum is at leaſt a million higher than the extraordinary expences of the army for three years in a time of peace. This exceſs being derived from the preceding war, muſt be reckoned a debt left by the war. And the ſame is true of 1.106,000 *l.* applied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards ſatisfying *German* demands.—There are likewiſe ſome ſmaller ſums of the ſame kind; ſuch as ſubſidies to *Heſſe-Caſſel, Brunſwick*, &c. And they may be taken at 200,000 *l.*—The total of all theſe Sums is 2.306,240 *l.*; which, added to 8.833,553 *l.* makes the whole diminution of the public debt ſince 1763, to be 11.139,793 *l.*—Towards diſcharging this debt, the nation, beſides the ſurplus of its ordinary revenue, has received, at different times between the years 1763 and 1768, from ſavings on high grants during the war, from the produce of *French* prizes, from the Bank for the renewal of their charter, from the ſale of lands in the ceded iſlands, and compoſition for maintaining *French* priſoners (*a*), 2.630,000 *l.* Alſo, from the profits of ten (*b*) lotteries (at 150,000 *l.* each lottery) 1.500,000 *l.*; from the *Eaſt-India* Company (400,000 *l. per ann.* for five years) 2.000,000 *l.*; from 1 *s.* extraordinary land-tax for 4 years, 1.750,000 *l.*; from debts diſcharged at a diſcount, 400,000 *l.*; (*c*): In all 8.280,000 *l.*—There remains to make up 11.139,793 *l.* (the whole debt diſcharged) 2.859,793 *l.*; and this, therefore, is the amount of the whole ſurplus of the ordinary revenue for 12 years; or 238,000 *l. per annum.*

Soon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to 6.983,553 *l.* was funded on the *Sinking Fund*, and on new duties on wine and cyder at 4 *per cent.* There has been ſince borrowed and funded on coals exported, window-lights, &c. 6.400,000 *l.* The funded debt, therefore, has increaſed ſince the war 13.383,553 *l.* It has decreaſed (as appears from page 47) 11.983,553 *l.*; and, conſequently, there has been on the whole an addition to it of 1.400,000 *l.*—During ſeven years, from 1767 to 1774, 1.415,883 *l.* navy-debt was paid off. See above. But, as this is a debt ariſing from conſtant deficiencies in the peace eſtimates for the navy, it is a part of the current peace expences.—In 1768 this debt was (*d*) 1.226,915 *l.*—In 1774 it was 1.850,000 *l.*; and conſequently, though 1.415,883 *l.* was paid off, an addition was made to it, in ſeven years, of 623,085 *l.* It encreaſed, therefore, according to this account, at the rate of 291,000 *l. per ann.*

Upon the whole, there is reaſon to believe, that the annual increaſe of the navy-debt might have been more truly ſtated in page 44, at 300,000 *l. per ann.* and this would have reduced the annual ſurplus of the revenue to 270.759 *l. per annum.*

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(*a*) See the particulars in a pamphlet intitled, *The preſent State of the nation*, publiſhed in 1768. Page 56.

(*b*) Four of theſe lotteries have been annexed to annuities; but it is a great miſtake to think that they have not been equally profitable with the other lotteries. For inſtance: In 1767 a million and a half was borrowed on annuities, at 3 *per cent.* with a lottery of 60,000 tickets annexed. In the ſame year 2.616,777 *l.* was paid off; but had it not been for the lottery, only 1.350,000 *l.* could have been raiſed on the annuities; and 150,000 *l.* leſs muſt have been paid off.

(*c*) The diſcounts only on a million and a half paid off in 1772, and 2 millions paid off in 1774 and 1775, amounted nearly to this ſum.

(*d*) See *The preſent State of the Nation*, page 51.

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